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Recent studies have shown that eyewitness confidence is positively associated with high
identification (ID) accuracy, but some eyewitness researchers have expressed concerns regarding
the reliability of this confidence-accuracy relationship in applied settings (e.g., are there
circumstances or moderator variables that make this relationship less reliable?). For the present
study, we considered two types of moderator variables: material difficulty (i.e., the difficulty
level associated with different sets of eyewitness stimuli) and individual difference factors such
as face recognition ability. Experiment 1 examined whether these moderator variables
significantly impair the confidence-accuracy relationship and Experiment 2 examined whether
these same moderator variables equally affect the effectiveness of simultaneous and sequential
lineup procedures. For Experiment 1, high confidence was generally associated with high
suspect-ID accuracy; however, a few sets of eyewitness stimuli with difficult situational factors
(e.g., poor viewing angle, short exposure duration, etc.) did lower suspect-ID accuracy below
90%, even for high-confidence identifications. Individual differences in face recognition ability
affected calibration but not suspect-ID accuracy of high-confidence identifications. For
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Experiment 2, first-yes rule sequential lineups tended to produce significantly lower lineup
discriminability compared to simultaneous lineups. Furthermore, under less optimal conditions,
high-confidence IDs from first-yes-rule sequential lineups appeared to be less reliable compared
to simultaneous lineups. Together, these findings suggest that both material difficulty and
individual difference factors (e.g., face recognition ability) can significantly influence eyewitness
identification performance.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Eyewitness identification (ID) plays a crucial role in both criminal investigations and court trials.
Given that identification accuracy is often judged based on eyewitness confidence, the
relationship between eyewitness confidence and accuracy has been widely debated among
eyewitness researchers and members of the criminal justice system. Recent advances in the field
of eyewitness research have shown that high-confidence identifications are associated with high
accuracy, at least on a first test with an unbiased lineup (Wixted & Wells, 2017). Despite these
promising findings, some researchers have expressed a few concerns regarding the reliability of
this confidence-accuracy relationship in applied settings: 1) How should we measure confidence
in applied settings?; 2) What constitutes “high confidence” judgments?; 3) Are there boundary
conditions? (Berkowitz & Frenda, 2018; Berkowitz, Garrett, Fenn, & Loftus, 2020; Sauer,
Palmer, & Brewer, 2019; Wade, Nash, & Lindsay, 2018; see also Wixted et al., 2021). We intend
to address these issues in the present study. However, before we describe our approach, we will
briefly describe the typical eyewitness identification experiment and then we will review the
recent development in the eyewitness literature concerning the confidence-accuracy relationship.

1.1 The Typical Eyewitness Identification Experiment
In the typical eyewitness identification experiment, participants are first shown an image of a
face (i.e., the target or the guilty suspect) or a mock-crime video of the guilty suspect. Following
this presentation, participants are asked to identify the suspect from a photo lineup. This lineup
can either be a target-present (TP) or target-absent (TA) lineup. In a target-present lineup, the
guilty suspect is presented alongside known innocent fillers. Participants can 1) identify the
1

suspect (a suspect ID), choose a filler (a target-present filler ID), or reject the lineup (a “Not
Present” response or a “Miss”). In a target-absent lineup, an innocent suspect is presented
alongside known innocent fillers. Participants can either 1) identify the innocent suspect (an
innocent suspect or false ID), choose a filler (a target-absent filler ID), or reject the lineup (a
“Not Present” response or a “Correct Rejection”). Following their identification decision,
participants are asked to rate their confidence in their decision. As such, this confidence
judgment is used as an indicator of identification accuracy.

1.2 The Relationship Between Eyewitness Confidence and
Accuracy
For decades, the relationship between eyewitness confidence and accuracy was thought to be
modest at best, but recent studies suggest that this early assessment was premature due to the
shortcomings of the analytic method used in earlier studies (Mickes, 2015; Wixted, Mickes,
Clark, Gronlund, & Roediger, 2015; Wixted & Wells, 2017). In the past, the confidenceaccuracy relationship was examined using a point-biserial correlation approach (CA r) in which
confidence ratings were correlated with a binary variable, accuracy. Figure 1A shows an
illustration of the point-biserial correlation approach with hypothetical data; the x-axis shows the
accuracy of identification decisions (correct or incorrect) and the y-axis shows the confidence
levels (in this case, a 5-point scale). In essence, the point-biserial approach provides information
about the average confidence levels for accurate and inaccurate IDs. However, as Juslin and
colleagues (1996) have pointed out, the point-biserial approach is sensitive to the distribution of
identification responses across confidence levels/categories (for more extensive discussion, see
Juslin et al., 1996). Imagine we have a hypothetical sample of witnesses who only assigned
2

confidence ratings of 80% (from a 100-point confidence scale) to all their identification
decisions and achieved an accuracy level of 80% (i.e., perfect calibration). Using the pointbiserial correlation approach, we would obtain a zero correlation despite the perfect
correspondence between confidence and accuracy. Said differently, witnesses can be perfect
judges of their identification performance, but a point-biserial correlation can still conceal this
perfect correspondence between confidence and accuracy. Thus, point-biserial correlations (large
or small) do not necessarily reflect the actual strength of the confidence-accuracy relationship.

Figure 1. (continued)

3

Figure 1. Figure 1A shows an illustration of the point-biserial approach with hypothetical data.
Figure 1B shows calibration plots from Palmer, Brewer, Weber, and Nagesh (2013, Exp. 1).
Figure 1C shows a CAC plot taken from Wixted and Wells (2017) of the same Palmer, Brewer,
Weber, and Nagesh (2013, Exp. 1) data.

4

More importantly, the most relevant question to the legal system is “given that an
eyewitness has expressed a particular level of confidence in his or her identification of a suspect,
how accurate is that identification likely to be?” (Wixted & Wells, 2017). Two approaches that
better address this question are the calibration approach (Juslin et al., 1996) and the confidenceaccuracy characteristic approach (CAC; Mickes, 2015). In contrast to the point-biserial
correlation approach, the calibration and CAC approaches plot the proportion or percentage of
correct identifications (y-axis) against each confidence level/category (x-axis). Figures 1B and
1C show the calibration and CAC plots of the same data from Palmer, Brewer, Weber, and
Nagesh (2013, Exp. 1), respectively. The calibration plots were taken from the original Palmer et
al. (2013) article, and the CAC plot was taken from Wixted and Wells (2017); Wixted and Wells
(2017) plotted the same data from Palmer et al. (2013, Exp. 1) as a CAC plot. Across exposure
duration (5 s or 90 s) and retention interval (immediate or delayed) experimental conditions, the
notable difference between these calibration and CAC plots is that the CAC plot shows higher
accuracy than the calibration plots. This difference in accuracy is the result of their respective
calculation process, discussed next.
Overall, the formula for the calibration and CAC calculations are similar. Assuming it is
a fair lineup without a designated innocent suspect, Equation (1) shows the full calibration
formula, and Equation (2) shows the calibration formula with target-present fillers omitted.
Because target-present fillers are known innocents, some calibration studies choose to omit
target-present filler IDs, Filler IDsTP but retain target-absent filler IDs, Filler IDsTA. In contrast,
the CAC approach is calculated using the formula from Equation (3). If there is no designated
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innocent suspect, Suspect IDsTA is calculated by the number of target-absent fillers divided by the
number of lineup members (Filler IDsTA/6).

In other words, the difference in the calculation between the calibration approach and the CAC
approach is the error component. The calibration approach treats all filler IDs as errors (Equation
1) or omits target-present fillers but retains target-absent filler IDs as errors (Equation 2),
whereas the CAC approach only considers suspect identifications from target-absent lineups (or
Filler IDsTA/6 when there is no designated innocent suspect) as errors (Equation 3). Unlike the
calibration calculation, the CAC calculation provides information specifically about the accuracy
of suspect IDs (or suspect-ID accuracy).
Calibration and CAC plots are constructed similarly. To construct calibration or CAC
plots, their respective calculation would be repeated for each confidence category (or confidence
bin). For example, if a 100-point confidence scale is divided into five confidence bins (e.g., 0-29,
30-49, 50-69, 70-89, and 90-100), then the calculation would be repeated five times. The
diagonal/identity line in a calibration plot illustrates a hypothetical curve that depicts perfect
calibration (e.g., a confidence rating of 90% corresponding to 90% accuracy). Using the
calibration and CAC approaches, researchers have often found a strong positive confidenceaccuracy relationship in both recent eyewitness identification studies and in the re-analyses of
6

earlier CA r studies (for a review, see Wixted & Wells, 2017), but CAC plots show higher
accuracy compared to calibration plots due to its calculation process.
Compared to the calibration approach, the CAC approach is more relevant in applied
settings. As stated above, the calibration approach treats filler IDs as errors, but real-world cases
of filler IDs would not proceed to a court trial. In contrast, the CAC approach is concerned with
cases of suspect IDs that would potentially end up in court. In addition, the calibration approach
requires the use of a 100-point, but the CAC approach is compatible with scale types other than a
100-point scale (e.g., 2-point and 3-point scales). Of course, when a non-probabilistic scale is
used, it is not possible to talk about the precise correspondence between confidence and accuracy
because those scale values do not have a priori values. In other words, the purpose of the
calibration approach is to examine the precise correspondence between confidence and accuracy,
whereas the purpose of the CAC analysis is to simply provide information about how suspect-ID
accuracy changes as a function of eyewitness confidence (e.g., high vs. low confidence). Thus,
the CAC approach better addresses the applied question that if a suspect is identified, how likely
is the identified person the guilty suspect?

1.3 Applying the Confidence-Accuracy Relationship to RealWorld Criminal Cases
Numerous studies have shown a positive relationship between eyewitness confidence and
accuracy on an initial test; however, knowing that high confidence is associated with high
accuracy alone does not provide enough guidance for the criminal justice system to make
informed judgments. Some eyewitness researchers have raised a few issues regarding the
application of the confidence-accuracy relationship in the applied settings: 1) How should we
7

measure confidence in applied settings? 2) What constitutes “high confidence” judgments? 3)
Are there boundary conditions? (Berkowitz & Frenda, 2018; Berkowitz et al., 2020; J. D. Sauer
et al., 2019; Wade et al., 2018).
Laboratory studies typically measure eyewitness confidence with a numeric confidence
scale (e.g., a 100-point scale), but the common protocol in applied settings is to have eyewitness
express their confidence in “their own words”. Studies comparing numeric scale and ordinal
scales with verbal labels show no difference (e.g., Tekin, Lin, & Roediger, 2018; Weber, Brewer,
& Margitich, 2008). More recently, a study by Mansour (2020) has shown that eyewitness
confidence is predictive of accuracy regardless of whether it was measured via a numeric scale
or expressed in the witness’s own words; however, Mansour noted the difficulty associated with
coding these verbal confidence statements. Unlike numeric scales, verbal statements may be
interpreted differently from their intended meaning because people vary in their interpretations
of probability phrases (e.g., Budescu, Por, & Broomell, 2012). Furthermore, verbal confidence
statements that contain justification phrases (e.g., "I remember the eyes") are perceived as less
confident than when no justification was provided at all (Dobolyi & Dodson, 2018; Dodson &
Dobolyi, 2015). Therefore, when witnesses express their confidence in their own words, it adds a
layer of variability to the legal process.
Without clear guidance on how to interpret and compare verbal confidence statements,
judges and jurors are left to decide what constitutes low, medium, or high confidence. Some
efforts have been made towards studying the correspondence between the interpretation of verbal
confidence statements and their intended meanings (e.g., Seale-Carlisle et al., in prep), but it is
clear that people differ in their interpretations of probability phrases and that verbal confidence
8

statements may not always be faithfully interpreted the way they are originally intended.
Extensive research would be required to account for various probability phrases, but this
challenge may be both infeasible and impractical for the criminal justice system to solve. Thus,
unsurprisingly, some researchers have argued in favor of shifting to numeric confidence scales in
applied settings (e.g., Sauer et al., 2019).
Numeric confidence scales would help solve the interpretation problem, but the question
of what constitutes low, medium, or high confidence remains. For instance, on a numeric
confidence scale, what is the minimum threshold value for high confidence identifications? For
applied settings, there would be a need for some general guidance on how to categorize or
interpret numeric confidence judgments. Different intervals in a numeric scale would need to be
prespecified for low, medium, and high confidence; these numeric boundaries should be not
arbitrarily determined. For the 100-point confidence scale commonly used in laboratory studies,
the 90 to 100% range is often designated as high confidence and ideally, the level of accuracy
should likewise be somewhere between 90 and 100% (i.e., high confidence is associated with
high accuracy). For police departments, a 2- or 3-point confidence scale is much easier to
implement than a 100-point confidence scale. Regardless of the scale length, the critical question
is how do we determine numeric boundaries, especially the threshold for “high confidence”
identifications?
One ostensible solution is to set a very conservative high-confidence threshold in which
identification errors are extremely rare or nonexistent. Yet, even if witnesses express high or
absolute certainty, it may not guarantee that there would be no errors at all. For example, even
though laboratory studies have shown that high confidence is associated with high accuracy,
9

some degree of variability in accuracy still exists for high confidence judgments in both
calibration and CAC plots. Even considering only identification responses in the upper end of the
confidence scale (e.g., a confidence rating of 90-100% or a confidence rating of 100%), accuracy
levels sometimes do fall above or below the identity line in calibration plots and likewise, the
accuracy of high-confidence identifications can vary across CAC studies (see Figure 2). This
suggests that people do occasionally make high-confidence errors.

10

Figure 2. Calibrations plots are shown on the left and CAC plots are shown on the right. The
CAC plots are taken from Wixted and Wells (2017). Both calibration and CAC curves varied in
degree of deviation from the identity line, suggesting a differential amount of under- and/or overconfidence.
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The core issue is not the length of the confidence scale because comparable confidenceaccuracy relations can be achieved with scales of different lengths (Tekin et al., 2018; Tekin &
Roediger, 2017); rather, it is whether any designated boundaries in a numeric scale (e.g.,2-point,
4-point, 5-point, etc.) are reliably associated with expected levels or ranges of accuracy. For
instance, Tekin and colleagues (2018) designated low and high confidence categories in both 2point (1 = low; 2= high) and 4-point (1-2 = low, 3-4 = high) confidence scales, and they found
comparable accuracy for high-confidence identifications across both scales. Figure 3A shows
these CAC plots for two different sets of eyewitness materials. Within each material set, highconfidence identifications were similarly accurate for both 2-point and 4-point scales. It is
important to reiterate that high-confidence identifications for the 2-point scale consisted of
identification made with a confidence rating of 2 and that high-confidence identifications for the
4-point scale consisted of identifications made with confidence ratings of 3 and 4. If an overly
conservative threshold rule was applied across the board, then only identifications made with a
confidence rating of 4 from a 4-point scale would be considered as “high confidence”
identifications. Yet, as Tekin and colleagues have shown, the inclusion of identifications made
with confidence ratings of both 3 and 4 from a 4-point scale still yielded an accuracy level
similar to that of identifications made with a confidence rating of 2 from a 2-point scale. In other
words, if a simple blanket rule is applied to all confidence scales, then some otherwise accurate
identifications may be discounted.

12

Figure 3. All of these CAC plots are taken from Tekin et al. (2018). 3A shows two CAC plots
for Material Sets A (left) and B (right), respectively. Each CAC plot shows the comparison
between the 2-point scale and the 4-point confidence scale. 3B shows a CAC plot of Material Set
A versus Material Set B.
What dictates a “high confidence” threshold/category should be the expected level(s) or
range of accuracy associated with it. For instance, although Tekin and colleagues (2018) reported
similar levels of accuracy for high-confidence identifications in both 2-point and 4-point
13

confidence scales, they did find a significant difference in accuracy between two different sets of
eyewitness stimuli for both of their designated low and high confidence categories (see Figure
3B). For the high confidence category, Set A yielded a significantly higher suspect-ID accuracy
than Set B (a 7% difference). In other words, the length of confidence scales does not matter, but
the risk of misidentifications may vary depending on the eyewitness stimuli used (or crime
scenarios), even for identifications in the designated “high confidence” category. Thus, applied
settings can benefit from having some prior knowledge about the possible range of suspect-ID
accuracy associated with the designated “high confidence” category in any confidence scale.
Overall, we agree with Wixted, Mickes, and Fisher (2018) that “it is the job of judges and
juries, not scientists, to make the difficult value judgment of deciding how reliable is reliable
enough.” However, we believe scientists can help judges and juries make more informed
judgments by providing a thorough investigation of the confidence-accuracy relationship,
especially the possible range of suspect-ID accuracy associated with different confidence
thresholds. To address this applied issue, it is worth asking basic questions such as why
deviations from perfect calibration occur in calibration plots or why the accuracy of highconfidence identifications sometimes varies in CAC plots? Both calibration and CAC plots from
laboratory studies often show some degrees of under- and/or over-confidence (i.e., above or
below the identity line), even with a large sample. These deviations from perfect calibration
occur throughout the range of the confidence scale in calibration studies, and the degree of
differences in accuracy also varies across calibration and CAC studies. It is important to note that
the confidence-accuracy relationship depicted in calibration and CAC plots represents
aggregated data. Because deviations (or errors) still occur at the aggregate level in a large
14

sample, it is reasonable to assume that at least some degrees of imprecision exist at the individual
level. Some individuals may be under- or over-confident, and as a result, we observe some
degrees of under- and/or over-confidence at the aggregate level. The amount of deviation in
accuracy typically decreases as confidence increases, but deviation or variations in accuracy can
still occur in the upper end of a confidence scale. Therefore, it is important to know what
circumstances or conditions can potentially cause individuals to be under- or over-confident.
Unlike laboratory studies, real-world cases do not always have the benefit of multiple
witnesses or the privilege of knowing beforehand that a suspect is indeed the culprit of a crime.
In some situations, the legal system must decide whether to move forward with a case given a
particular level of confidence expressed by a single witness. The critical question is how reliable
is the witness’s confidence statement? In such cases, the precision in which eyewitness
confidence corresponds to an expected level or range of accuracy becomes ever more important.
While we know that high confidence is associated with high accuracy, we should examine
potential boundary conditions in which the risk of misidentifications may be higher even for
“high confidence” identifications.

1.4 Two Sources of Variability
Deviations from perfect calibration or variability in suspect-ID accuracy are innocuous in
laboratory studies, but they present a reliability (or precision) issue in the applied settings. In the
present study, we argue that there are two potential sources of variability that contribute to
imprecision in the relationship between confidence and accuracy across studies: situational
factors (e.g., the quality of the encoding condition, the way of the police lineup is constructed,
etc.) and individual difference factors (e.g., people’s general face recognition ability, response
15

bias, personality, etc.). In the following sections, we will discuss how both situational factors and
individual difference factors can influence the eyewitness confidence-accuracy relationship.

1.4.1 Situational Factors
A quick visual comparison of calibration and CAC plots from various studies reveals differences
in accuracy. Because these studies employed different sets of eyewitness materials, a reasonable
explanation for these differences in accuracy could be attributed to the nature of the eyewitness
materials (e.g., the quality of the encoding condition, the similarity in lineup foils, lineup task
instructions, etc.). In the eyewitness literature, these moderator variables are typically
categorized as either estimator or system variables. Estimator variables refer to factors that
influence accuracy but are not under the control of the legal system (e.g., the distance between
the witness and the perpetrator, exposure duration to the perpetrator, etc.), whereas system
variables refer to factors that are under the control of the justice system (e.g., lineup construction,
lineup procedures, etc.). Although only the latter variables are under the control of the legal
system in the real world, both types of variables are within the control of the experimenter(s) in
laboratory studies. For the present study, we will collectively refer to these moderator variables
as “situational factors”. Like Leippe and Eisenstadt (2006), we define situational factors as
moderator variables that cover all aspects from the encoding conditions and the testing
conditions (i.e., both estimator and system variables).
Several laboratory studies have examined the effects of situational factors (i.e., estimator
and system variables) on overall identification accuracy (see Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987 for
a brief overview). For instance, longer exposure time is associated with an increase in
identification accuracy (Horry, Halford, Brewer, Milne, & Bull, 2014; Memon, Hope, & Bull,
16

2003; Palmer et al., 2013). Compared to unbiased lineup instructions (e.g., “The suspect may or
may not be in the lineup.”), biased lineup instructions (e.g., ‘‘We have the suspect in custody and
would like to show you a lineup to see if you can identify the suspect.”) have been shown to
increase the rate of choosing from a lineup as well as the rate of erroneous identification (Clark,
2005; Greathouse & Kovera, 2009; Malpass & Devine, 1981; N. M. Steblay, 1997). Influences
on identification accuracy have been shown with other situational factors such as the distance
between the witness and the perpetrator (Horry et al., 2014; Lampinen, Erickson, Moore, &
Hittson, 2014; Lindsay, Semmler, Weber, Brewer, & Lindsay, 2008), the presence of a weapon
(Mansour, Hamilton, & Gibson, 2019; N. M. Steblay, 1992), similarity among lineup members
(Colloff, Wilson, Seale-Carlisle, & Wixted, 2021; Fitzgerald, Oriet, & Price, 2015; Fitzgerald,
Price, Oriet, & Charman, 2013), as well as other factors. All the variables just listed can reduce
overall identification accuracy.
Although some situational factors can affect the correspondence (i.e., calibration)
between eyewitness confidence and accuracy (e.g., Brewer, Keast, & Rishworth, 2002; Dodson
& Dobolyi, 2016; Palmer et al., 2013; J. Sauer, Brewer, Zweck, & Weber, 2010), suspect-ID
accuracy of high-confidence identifications (from unbiased, fair lineups) tends to be resistant to
the effects of situational factors (e.g., Carlson, Dias, Weatherford, & Carlson, 2017; Semmler,
Dunn, Mickes, & Wixted, 2018; Wixted & Wells, 2017). For instance, Palmer and colleagues
(2013) found better calibration performance in easier conditions (90-s exposure and immediate
testing) compared to more difficult conditions (5-s exposure and delayed testing). Similarly,
Dodson and Dobolyi (2016) reported better calibration performance for same-race identifications
compared to cross-race identifications. When analyzed using the CAC approach, these same
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studies showed that high confidence is associated with high suspect-ID accuracy regardless of
experimental conditions. In fact, this pattern was observed across 20 studies presented in the
recent review by Wixted and Wells (2017); these studies employed different types of confidence
scales (e.g., 5-point, 100-point, etc.), but the high-confidence category of each scale consistently
yielded a suspect-ID accuracy level of 90% or above. Even these findings are indeed
encouraging, it is important not to overlook potential boundary conditions that may deviate from
this general pattern (i.e., high-confidence identifications associated with a suspect-ID accuracy
level below 90%).
Boundary conditions may be rare, but perhaps some situational factors may have been
overlooked. For instance, a few recently published studies reported suspect-ID accuracy levels
lower than 90% even for high-confidence identifications involving suboptimal situational factors
(Giacona, Lampinen, & Anastasi, 2021; Lockamyeir, Carlson, Jones, Carlson, & Weatherford,
2020; Pezdek, Abed, & Reisberg, 2020). Lockamyeir et al. manipulated the viewing distance
between a witness and a perpetrator (3 m, 10 m, and 20 m). Compared to suspect-ID accuracy of
high-confidence identifications in the 3 m and 10 m conditions, suspect-ID accuracy in the 20 m
condition fell below 75%. Pezdek et al. manipulated marijuana use during encoding and found
that suspect-ID accuracy of high-confidence identifications was lower in the marijuana than in
the control condition (68% accuracy vs. 85% accuracy, respectively). These studies are not the
only exceptions.
In their reanalysis of four datasets, Sauer et al. (2019) noted that lineup construction
methods can affect suspect-ID accuracy levels of high-confidence identifications (see Sauer et
al., 2019 for more details). Here, we have chosen to discuss their reanalysis of the Gronlund et al.
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(2009) data. Their reanalysis revealed that the quality of the guilty suspect (strong vs. weak) and
designated innocent suspect (strong vs. weak) photos had significant effects on the suspect-ID
accuracy levels in their CAC curves1. Figure 4 shows four CAC curves, one for each
combination of strong/weak guilty suspect and innocent suspect. In the strong guilty suspect
condition (the left side of Figure 4), the accuracy of high-confidence identifications (90-100%
confidence) was significantly lower when there was a strong innocent suspect than when there
was a weak innocent suspect. The lowest accuracy for high-confidence identifications was when
it involved a weak guilty suspect and a strong innocent suspect. Sauer et al. also noted that most
of these CAC curves were below the typically reported accuracy level of 90-100%. Based on
their reanalysis of the Gronlund et al. (2009) data and the three other datasets, Sauer and
colleagues concluded that high confidence may not always imply high accuracy. They also
further expressed concerns about how real-world lineup construction methods might affect the
confidence-accuracy relationship because the original researchers of those four datasets carefully
and thoughtfully constructed their lineups and yet these same data showed differences in
accuracy even for high-confidence identifications.

1

The strong guilty suspect photo was taken on the same day and in the same location as the mock crime video; the
weak guilty suspect photo was taken weeks after the video with the perpetrator’s facial hair grown and minor
changes to his hairstyle. The designated innocent suspect photos were chosen based on description matched to the
perpetrator and their similarity to the weak guilty suspect photo as determined through their pilot testing (for more
information, see Gronlund et al., 2009). Of the two individuals given high similarity ratings, the individual who was
selected at a much higher rate served as the strong innocent suspect and the remaining individual served as the weak
innocent suspect.
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Figure 4. These CAC plots are taken from Sauer et al.’s (2019) reanalysis of Gronlund et al.’s
(2009) data. The four CAC curves show the four different combinations of strong/weak guilty
suspect and innocent suspect. Accuracy for high-confidence identifications still differed across
the four conditions.
In addition to their concerns about lineup construction methods, Sauer et al. (2019) also
have questioned whether either the calibration or CAC approach adequately estimates the error
rates in applied settings. As previously described, the calibration approach treats all target-absent
filler IDs as errors, but the CAC approach only considers suspect identification from targetabsent lineups as errors. In other words, the calibration approach will always have a larger error
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component than the CAC approach. Sauer and colleagues argue that the calibration approach
deliberately overestimates error rates, whereas the CAC approach may underestimate error rates.
If the innocent suspect ID rates in laboratory studies are lower than those in applied settings, then
laboratory-based CAC studies may underestimate the error rates compared to those in calibration
studies (for more details, see Sauer et al., 2019). Because of this issue, Sauer and colleagues
further argue that it is unclear whether either the calibration or CAC approach “allows for a
reliable and generalizable estimate of the absolute level of accuracy associated with individual
levels of confidence”. Instead, they have suggested a worst-case scenario approach in which the
most frequently selected member from target-absent lineups acts as the designated innocent
suspect. Regardless of the approaches, there is some evidence that situational factors can affect
the confidence-accuracy relationship.
In short, high confidence is generally associated with high suspect-ID accuracy, but the
effects of some situational factors can significantly lower suspect-ID accuracy (below 90%).
Although these boundary conditions may be rare, these exceptions should not be overlooked
because prior knowledge of these boundary conditions will help the applied settings make more
informed judgments. Thus, for the present study, we expected situational factors (e.g., easy vs.
difficulty) to contribute to the variability in suspect-ID accuracy. In the next section, we will
discuss another source of variability– individual difference factors.

1.4.2 Individual Difference Factors
In the eyewitness identification literature, research on individual difference factors is
quite scarce and scattered. Given the typical single-trial nature of eyewitness identification
experiments, the paucity of individual difference studies is not a surprise. Some early studies
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have examined the correlation between identification performance and traits such as selfmonitoring (i.e., the extent to which people monitor and regulate how they are perceived by
others) and field independence (i.e., the extent to which people’s ability to discriminate separate
details from their surrounding context), but these early attempts have been met with small effects
or inconsistent results (Courtois & Mueller, 1981; Cutler & Wolfe, 1989; Hosch, 1994).
However, one promising finding is the association between individual differences in face
recognition ability and eyewitness identification accuracy (Bindemann, Brown, Koyas, & Russ,
2012; Gettleman, Grabman, Dobolyi, & Dodson, 2021; Grabman, Dobolyi, Berelovich, &
Dodson, 2019; Hosch, 1994; Hosch, Bothwell, Sporer, & Saucedo, 1989). This association is
expected given the findings from the general face recognition literature.
Face Recognition Ability. Outside of the eyewitness literature, face recognition studies
have shown that there are substantial variations in people’s ability to recognize faces (for a
review, see Wilmer, 2017). On one extreme of the spectrum are individuals with developmental
prosopagnosia, a condition characterized by severe face recognition problems (e.g., difficulty
with recognizing even familiar faces) despite normal vision and in the absence of brain injury
(Corrow, Dalrymple, & Barton, 2016). At the other extreme of the spectrum are superrecognizers who possess an extraordinary ability to remember faces that they have only briefly
encountered years earlier (Davis, Jansari, & Lander, 2013; Russell, Duchaine, & Nakayama,
2009). Of course, most people are neither prosopagnosics nor super-recognizers, but they are
somewhere along this spectrum. Face recognition ability, like IQ, is heritable, but standardized
IQ tests only explain about 3-4% of the variation in face recognition (Richler, Wilmer, &
Gauthier, 2017; Shakeshaft & Plomin, 2015; Wilmer, 2017; Wilmer, Germine, & Nakayama,
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2014). Moreover, there is little to no evidence that face recognition ability can be trained in
adults (Devue & Barsics, 2016; Dolzycka, Herzmann, Sommer, & Wilhelm, 2014; Tree, Horry,
Riley, & Wilmer, 2017), but it may be partially remediable for developmental prosopagnosics
(DeGutis, Chiu, Grosso, & Cohan, 2014). In other words, people can vary significantly in their
ability to recognize faces and this ability remains relatively resilient to change. Based on these
findings, it is unsurprising that face recognition ability contributes to eyewitness identification
performance (Gettleman et al., 2021; Grabman et al., 2019; Morgan et al., 2007).
There are now an accumulating number of eyewitness studies that have shown a positive
relationship between eyewitness identification performance and face recognition ability
measured with various face tests: the Benton Facial Recognition Test (Geiselman et al., 2001;
Hosch et al., 1989), the Weschler Face Test (Morgan et al., 2007), and the Cambridge Face
Memory Test (e.g., Andersen, Carlson, Carlson, & Gronlund, 2014; Grabman, Dobolyi,
Berelovich, & Dodson, 2019). For example, Andersen et al. (2014) examined the relationship
between CFMT performance and two types of lineup procedures (simultaneous vs. sequential
lineups). For the target-present condition, participants who scored high on the CFMT (i.e., good
face recognizers) were more likely to identify the perpetrator when given a simultaneous lineup,
but this benefit was not observed in those who were given a sequential lineup. For the targetabsent condition, participants who scored high on the CFMT were less likely to choose an
innocent suspect when given either a simultaneous or a sequential lineup. Similarly, Grabman
and colleagues (2019) have shown that strong face recognizers are more likely to make high-
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confidence misidentifications compared to weak face recognizers (see Figure 5) 2. Adding to this
finding, Gettleman et al. (Gettleman et al., 2021) posit that strong face recognizers are more
adept at scaling their confidence judgments than weak face recognizers because of differences in
metacognitive abilities afforded by their face recognition ability. Therefore, face recognition
ability not only plays a critical role in the accuracy of eyewitness identification but also in the
reliability of eyewitness confidence judgments.

Figure 5. This figure is taken from Grabman et al. (2019). It shows that the interaction between
CFMT and confidence for choosers. High confidence was associated with high chooser accuracy
for individuals with good face recognition abilities (i.e., high CFMT scores); however, this was
not the case for individuals with poor face recognition abilities.

2

The accuracy levels in Figure 5 are chooser accuracy values (i.e., accuracy of all chooser responses) based on the
full calibration formula (Equation 1): Correct IDs target-present/[ Correct IDs target-present + False IDs target-present + False
IDs] target-absent]. Chooser accuracy values are lower than suspect-ID accuracy values because the smaller error
component in the suspect-ID accuracy formula: Correct IDs target-present/[ Correct IDs target-present + (False IDs target-absent /
lineup size)] if there was no designated innocent suspect. Since the Grabman et al. analyzed their data using a
mixed-effect model approach, their calculation was limited to chooser accuracy because the mixed-effect model
approach cannot divide the number of False IDs by the lineup size.
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Metacognition. Another potential individual difference factor is metacognition. More
specifically, individual differences in the ability to monitor and judge one’s own performance
accurately (i.e., metacognitive monitoring). Individual differences in metacognitive performance
have been observed across different domains (Morphew, 2021; Roebers, Krebs, & Roderer,
2014; Zakrzewski, Wisniewski, Williams, & Berry, 2019; Zhou & Jenkins, 2020). For instance,
Zhou and Jenkins (2020) measured metacognitive accuracy across different face perception
tasks, and they found that low performers tended to overestimate themselves, whereas high
performers tended to underestimate themselves. However, whether metacognitive performance
reflects domain-general or domain-specific processes has been a contentious topic within the
metacognition literature (Erickson & Heit, 2015; Kelemen, Frost, & Weaver, 2000; Mazancieux,
Fleming, Souchay, & Moulin, 2020; Morales, Lau, & Fleming, 2018; Scott & Berman, 2013).
Said differently, are people’s metacognitive performance (e.g., their tendency to over- or
underestimate their performance) consistent across unrelated tasks or limited to tasks of a
specific domain?
If metacognitive monitoring is domain-general, then metacognitive performance between
different tasks should be positively correlated. Some studies have indeed observed this pattern of
results (Bornstein & Zickafoose, 1999; Dentakos, Saoud, Ackerman, & Toplak, 2019; Jackson &
Kleitman, 2014). For example, participants in the Bornstein and Zickafoose (1999; Exp. 1) study
were overall overconfident in both the general knowledge task and the eyewitness
questionnaires, but more importantly, their degrees of overconfidence and calibration were also
positively correlated across these two domains, r = .34, p < .05, and r = .38, p < .01, respectively.
Likewise, Dentakos et al. (2019) found positive correlations in calibration across four different
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tasks (general knowledge, financial calculation, probability calculation, and the social skill of
emotion recognition), suggesting domain generality in metacognition. Therefore, it may be
possible that how individuals scale their confidence judgment in an eyewitness identification task
could be positively correlated with other tasks.
Overall, the role of individual difference factors in eyewitness identification performance
remains largely unexplored, but recent findings seem to suggest that individual differences can
be a source of variance in the reliability of the eyewitness confidence-accuracy relationship.
Ideally, the study of individual differences should take into consideration of various situational
factors as there may be interactions between situational factors and individual differences (e.g.,
the lineup procedure format and CFMT performance). Thus, the present study considered both
situational factors and individual difference factors as potential sources of variability that
moderate the eyewitness confidence-accuracy relationship.

1.5 Theories
The purpose of the present study was not to test specific accounts about the eyewitness
confidence-accuracy relationship, but it is worth mentioning the different predictions made by
these accounts. Of particular interest are the following accounts: the optimality account
(Deffenbacher, 1980), the likelihood-ratio account (Semmler et al., 2018), and the decisionprocesses account (Gettleman et al., 2021). In the following section, we will briefly describe
these accounts and their predictions.

1.5.1 The Optimality Account
Deffenbacher’s (1980) optimality hypothesis states that the optimality of informationprocessing conditions (encoding, storage, and retrieval) influences the strength of the correlation
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between confidence and accuracy. More specifically, the confidence-accuracy correlation should
be higher for favorable conditions (e.g., long exposure to a target face) than unfavorable
conditions (e.g., short exposure to a target face). Evidence in support of this account comes
primarily from studies that measure the confidence-accuracy relationship in terms of correlations
(e.g., Bothwell et al., 1987; Brigham, 1990; Deffenbacher, 1980, 2008). Since the introduction of
other analytic approaches (e.g., calibration, CAC, etc.), researchers have examined the optimality
account in terms of other dependent variables (Gettleman et al., 2021; Palmer et al., 2013;
Semmler et al., 2018). Regardless of the dependent variable, the central argument of the
optimality account simply states that the predictive value of eyewitness confidence depends on
the optimality of information-processing conditions. In other words, the optimality account
would predict a poorer correspondence between confidence and accuracy for conditions with less
optimal situational and individual difference factors.

1.5.2 The Likelihood-Ratio Account
In contrast to the optimality account, the likelihood-ratio account posits that highconfidence judgments remain highly reliable even under suboptimal conditions (Semmler et al.,
2018). According to the likelihood-ratio account, individuals “fan out” their confidence criteria
across a memory-strength continuum in less optimal conditions, such that their high-confidence
criterion shifts to a more conservative part of the continuum and their low-confidence criterion
shifts to a more liberal part of the continuum (for more details, see Semmler et al., 2018). By
“fanning out” their confidence criteria for suboptimal conditions, CAC accuracy of highconfidence judgments can remain unaffected because high-confidence decisions now require
more memory evidence. Proponents of the likelihood-ratio account suggest that we learn to make
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these adjustments from a lifetime of error-feedback training (Mickes, Hwe, Wais, & Wixted,
2011). Through our everyday experiences, we learn that we need a stronger memory signal
before making a high-confidence judgment if, for example, we had seen a face from a distance
versus if we had seen the same face up-close. Consistent with this explanation, Semmler et al.’s
(2018) reanalysis of the Lindsay et al. (2008) data reveals no differences in CAC accuracy of
high confidence identifications for long versus short viewing distance. Thus, based on the
likelihood-ratio account, suboptimal situational factors do not decrease the reliability of highconfidence identifications.

1.5.3 The Decision-Processes Account
An alternative to the two aforementioned accounts is the decision-processes account.
The decision-processes account suggests that expertise in a specific domain is accompanied by
enhanced metacognitive abilities for that domain (Gettleman et al., 2021; Kruger & Dunning,
1999). Said differently, expert individuals in a specific domain are better judges of their
performance in that domain. Consistent with this explanation, strong face recognizers’
confidence judgments were more predictive of accuracy on eyewitness identification tasks
compared to those of weak face recognizers (Grabman et al., 2019); strong face recognizers are
also generally better able at scaling their confidence judgments compared to weak face
recognizers (Gettleman et al., 2021). By manipulating difficulty levels via repetition and delay,
Gettleman and colleagues found that strong face recognizers were less likely to use the upper end
of the confidence scale when an experimental condition’s overall identification accuracy was
poor than when it was high (i.e., difficult vs. easy); however, weak face recognizers were less
likely to make these types of adjustments. In short, the decision-processes account suggests that
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strong face recognizers, compared to weak face recognizers, are better able to evaluate their face
recognition performance across all levels of difficulty associated with situational factors.
In summary, each of the three accounts makes different predictions about whether and
how moderator variable(s) may influence the confidence-accuracy relationship. It is worth noting
that researchers have examined these accounts using different dependent variables. For instance,
early evidence in support of the Deffenbacher’s (1980) optimality hypothesis came from
correlations, but Palmer et al. (2013) tested the optimality account in terms of the Adjusted
Normalized Resolution Index (ANRI), an index that assesses the extent to which accuracy
associated with each confidence deviates from overall accuracy. Semmler et al. (Semmler et al.,
2018) tested the optimality account and the likelihood-ratio accounts in terms of CAC accuracy,
whereas Gettleman et al. (Gettleman et al., 2021) tested the optimality account and the decisionprocesses account in terms of participant calibration scores. Moreover, to our knowledge, the
likelihood-ratio account and the decision-processes account have not been directly compared.
However, testing specific theories is beyond the scope of the present study. As we stated earlier,
the purpose of the present study was not to test theories, but we were interested in addressing the
more applied-setting relevant questions. In the next section, we will provide an overview of our
study approach and experiments.
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Chapter 2: Overview of Study Approach and
Experiments
Although high confidence is often associated with high accuracy, it is important to know whether
there are potential boundary conditions in which eyewitness confidence becomes less predictive
of accuracy. In applied settings, there may not be multiple witnesses or prior knowledge of a
suspect’s guilty status. One critical question is how reliable is a single witness’s confidence
judgment? We argued that the predictability of eyewitness confidence is moderated by
situational factors, individual difference factors, or probably both sets of factors. Thus, the
purpose of the present study was to examine whether the effects of situational factors and/or
individual difference factors could significantly reduce the strength of the eyewitness
confidence-accuracy relationship. In the following sections, we will provide our reasoning on
how we examined situational and individual difference factors.

2.1 Conceptualizing Situational Factors as “Material
Difficulty”
More than one approach exists to study the effects of situational factors on eyewitness
identification performance. One approach is to systematically manipulate one or more specific
situational factors (e.g., retention interval, distance, etc.) to produce conditions with varying
difficulty levels (e.g., Gettleman et al., 2020; Weber & Brewer, 2004). An alternative approach is
to simply conceptualize situational factors as “materials difficulty”. That is, rather than
manipulating a specific situational factor, a selection of different eyewitness material sets (e.g.,
robbery, drawing graffiti, etc.) are used to produce differences in difficulty levels. For example, a
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“material difficulty” effect was observed in Tekin, Lin, and Roediger (2018). Participants were
exposed to two different sets of eyewitness materials created by two different eyewitness
researchers (i.e., different videos, suspects, and fillers). Although the CAC plot showed a
positive confidence-accuracy relationship for both sets of materials, accuracy between these two
sets of materials significantly differed at both the low and high confidence levels/bins (see Figure
6). In other words, one set of materials was more difficult than the other, leading to a positive
confidence-accuracy relationship with differences in accuracy across confidence bins. Therefore,
differences in the confidence-accuracy relationship can simply be obtained with crime scenes
and lineups that vary widely in difficulty.

Figure 6. The CAC plot is taken from Tekin, Lin, and Roediger (2018). Participants saw two sets
of eyewitness materials (Set A and Set B). Although a positive confidence-accuracy relationship
was observed for both sets of materials, accuracy was significantly lower in Set B than Set A for
both low and high confidence ratings.
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The present study used this material difficulty approach. We gathered twelve different
sets of eyewitness materials (videos and lineup photos) created by different eyewitness
researchers. These materials vary in their content (e.g., shoplifting, drawing graffiti, robbery,
etc.) and situational factors (e.g., exposure duration, filler similarity, etc.). For the present study,
we used d’ as a measure of material difficulty. Because these twelve sets of materials produced
different combinations of hits and false alarm rates, we had a wide range of material difficulty
levels (d′ < 1 to d′ > 2). Lastly, given these materials were created by different eyewitness
researchers1, they also serve as a rough proxy for how different real-world police departments
might put together their lineups for various criminal cases.

2.2 Studying Individual Difference Factors
Prior studies have shown that individual differences in face recognition ability can affect the
reliability of the eyewitness confidence-accuracy relationship (Gettleman et al., 2021; Grabman
et al., 2019). In the present study, our primary analyses also focused on the role of face
recognition ability in eyewitness identification, but we also wanted to explore other individual
difference factors. For our exploratory analyses, we examined a few tasks that may be
informative of identification performance (Eyewitness Metamemory Scale, Glasgow Face
Matching Test, a DRM lineup task, and a general knowledge test). We briefly described these
tasks in the next few sections.
The Eyewitness Metamemory Scale is a brief questionnaire for assessing self-ratings of
face recognition ability and uses of strategies to encode faces (Saraiva et al., 2019). According to
Saraiva et al., this self-report measure may provide clues as to why some individuals make high1

We would like to thank Neil Brewer, John Wixted, Ruth Horry, Steven Clark, and Laura Mickes for sending us
their eyewitness stimuli.
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confidence misidentifications (e.g., some individuals may be not aware of their extent of face
recognition ability). In other words, the EMS may provide insights into one’s face recognition
ability and memory functioning. The EMS measures three factors: Memory Contentment (e.g.,
My ability to remember faces is much better than other people's ability to remember faces.),
Memory Discontentment (e.g., My ability to correctly remember where and when I saw a
particular face has deteriorated over time), and Memory Strategies (e.g., I often create a visual
image in my mind of a face that I want to remember.). Given this metamemory scale is recently
published, there is little to no research that examines the utility of this scale in differentiating
accurate witnesses from inaccurate ones. Thus, we evaluated the effectiveness of this
metamemory scale.
As stated earlier, we included two commonly used face tasks (the Cambridge Face
Memory Test and the Glasgow Face Matching Test) in our study. Whereas the 72-item
Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT) measures face recognition or face memory (i.e., one’s
ability to recognize previously studied faces after a delay), the 40-item Glasgow Face Matching
Test (GFMT) measures face perception (i.e., one’s ability to discriminate among simultaneously
presented faces). Although face recognition and face perception abilities are related, they involve
dissociable mechanisms and have different developmental trajectories (Dalrymple, Garrido, &
Duchaine, 2014; Weigelt et al., 2014). Some individuals with developmental prosopagnosia can
complete face perception tasks with normal accuracy even when they are severely impaired in
face memory tasks (Dalrymple et al., 2014). In other words, poor performance in the GFMT
might also be linked to poor performance on the eyewitness identification task. However, it is
also possible that individuals who performed poorly on the eyewitness identification task and
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CFMT could potentially perform well on the GFMT because deficits in face memory ability may
be spared in face perception ability. In short, we were interested in whether the combination of
CFMT and GFMT performance better account for identification performance differences than
CFMT alone.
Besides face abilities, we also measured word recognition performance via a DRM lineup
task (Finley, Wixted, & Roediger, 2020). This word recognition task was suggested as a means
to distinguish face recognition ability from general recognition ability. The format of the DRM
lineup task is similar to that of police lineups except those participants were asked to identify
previously seen words instead of faces. Based on prior studies from the face recognition
literature, we expected face recognition ability to be unrelated to word recognition (Robotham &
Starrfelt, 2017; Susilo, Wright, Tree, & Duchaine, 2015). However, if both face and word
recognition are related to a general recognition ability, then performance in both face and word
recognition tasks may correlate with each other.
Lastly, we were interested in exploring whether people’s ability to judge their own
performance (i.e., calibration) is consistent across different tasks. For instance, do some people
consistently under- or overestimate their task performance in different domains? For the present
study, we examined people’s ability to calibrate themselves across four different asks: face
recognition (eyewitness identification), word recognition, face perception task (GFMT), and
general knowledge. People’s degree of overconfidence or their ability calibration in one domain
may correlate with those in another domain (Bornstein & Zickafoose, 1999; Dentakos et al.,
2019). If metacognition is domain-general, then metacognitive performance in one task should
correlate with that of another task. If it is domain-specific, then we would expect two closely
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related tasks (i.e., face recognition and face perception) should correlate better than to an
unrelated task (i.e., general knowledge).

2.3 Overview of Experiment 1
The primary goal in Experiment 1 was to determine whether the correspondence between
eyewitness confidence and accuracy is moderated by either material difficulty and/or individual
differences in face recognition ability (i.e., are there boundary conditions?). We approached this
question in several different ways. For example, we examined whether the accuracy level for a
given confidence bin (e.g., 90-100) differs across varying levels of material difficulty and/or face
recognition ability. For applied settings, the critical question is “what constitutes a highconfidence identification?” Therefore, we examined the shapes of our CAC curves (i.e., the
amount of deviation from perfect calibration) and the changes in accuracy when moving from a
liberal high-confidence threshold (70-100) to a conservative threshold (90-100). Moreover, Sauer
et al. (2019) questioned whether the calibration or CAC approach used in laboratory studies
appropriately estimates the error rates observed in applied settings. In response to this concern,
we also examined our data using the calibration approach and a worst-case scenario approach in
addition to the CAC approach. The analyses for answering these questions will be further
discussed in the results section.
In addition to our primary objectives, we were interested in exploring whether other
individual difference factors (e.g., insight about one’s face abilities and memory functioning,
face perception, and metacognitive tendencies) may also influence the reliability of the
confidence-accuracy relationship. A few studies have shown that performance on the CFMT is
predictive of performance on eyewitness identification tasks (Gettleman et al., 2021; Grabman et
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al., 2019); however, it is largely unknown whether other individual difference factors may
contribute to the calibration between confidence and accuracy. We will present these exploratory
findings following our primary analyses.

2.4 Overview of Experiment 2
One of the frequently debated topics in the eyewitness literature is the effectiveness of
simultaneous versus sequential lineups. Our primary goal for Experiment 2 was to examine the
effectiveness of these two lineup procedures accounting for the joint effects of material difficulty
and face recognition ability, which prior studies have not considered. A study by Andersen et al.
(2014) found that individuals who scored high on the CFMT were more likely to identify the
perpetrator when given a simultaneous lineup than when they were given a sequential lineup; this
CFMT advantage, however, was limited only to the target-present condition. High CFMT
participants did not differ in their innocent suspect ID rates regardless of whether they had
received a simultaneous or sequential lineup. Because Andersen et al. did not report CAC
analysis, it is also unclear whether the interaction between CFMT performance and lineup
procedures translates to differences in the strength of the confidence-accuracy relationship. For
Experiment 2, we re-examined whether one lineup procedure is more effective across variations
in material difficulty and individual differences in face recognition ability and whether these
variables also produce differences in the confidence-accuracy relationship.
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Chapter 3: Experiment 1
Experiment 1 examined the effects of material difficulty in crime scenes and lineups used in
prior eyewitness identification studies, with difficulty likely due to differences in situational
factors such as exposure duration during encoding, filler similarity during testing, etc. In addition
to our primary analyses, we also 1) explored the role of other variables (e.g., self-report face
recognition ability and memory functioning, and face-matching and word recognition
performance) on identification performance and 2) asked whether individuals show a general
metacognitive ability across tasks from different domains (i.e., is the ability to calibrate across
tasks domain-general or domain-specific?). Here, we outlined our specific hypotheses.
Hypotheses 1-5 were for our primary analyses and hypotheses 6-9 were for our exploratory
analyses.
Hypothesis 1: We expected to see a positive confidence-accuracy relationship across all
materials, but this relationship would be moderated by both material difficulty and individual
differences in face recognition ability.
Hypothesis 2: Given the effects of material difficulty and/or individual differences in
face recognition ability, differences should exist in suspect-ID accuracy even for identifications
made with “high confidence”. Like other eyewitness studies, we defined high-confidence
identifications as those made with a confidence rating of 90 or above from a 100-point scale.
Hypothesis 3: We predicted similar overall performance when the high confidence
threshold is extended to 80-100 from 90-100. However, we expected variations in accuracy when
material difficulty is high or when face recognition ability is very poor.
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Hypothesis 4: The difficulty level of material will affect choosers’ calibration
performance (i.e., deviation from perfect calibration). That is, the more difficult a lineup
scenario, the poorer calibration should be on it.
Hypothesis 5: For our analysis involving the three different identification accuracy
calculations (calibration, CAC, and worst-case-scenario approaches), we expected CAC to show
a higher confidence-accuracy curve than the other approaches. Because we did not use
designated innocent suspects in any of our materials, the CAC estimated false rate (target-absent
filler IDs divided by lineup size) should be smaller than in the other two approaches, and hence,
accuracy should be overall higher in the CAC curve.
Hypothesis 6: Because prior studies have shown that people only have a modest level of
insight into their face abilities, we expected the eyewitness metamemory scale (EMS) to be of
low utility in differentiating good from poor witnesses.
Hypothesis 7: Face recognition and face perception (face matching) involve related but
dissociable mechanisms. Therefore, we expected face matching performance, like face
recognition performance, to be predictive of eyewitness identification performance.
Hypothesis 8: Prior literature has suggested that face recognition is unrelated to word
recognition; therefore, we expected word recognition (DRM lineups) performance to not be
predictive of eyewitness identification performance.
Hypothesis 9: We expected people to show a small but general consistency in how they
scale their confidence judgments across tasks (e.g., over- or underconfident), but related tasks
(calibration between two face tasks) may be more correlated in calibration than unrelated tasks
(calibration between a word task and a face task).
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3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
For Session 1, we recruited 1,092 participants from the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and
Prolific platforms. They received $4.00 for their participation in Session 1. We excluded 26
participants who had technical issues (e.g., multiple videos not playing, internet browser glitches,
etc.), who did not complete the entire experiment, or who had failed attention checks (see the
Procedure section for details about the specific attention checks). With the remaining 1,066
participants (540 females, 505 males, and 21 other/not reported), we had a total of 12,792
observations (12 lineup trials per participant). Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 74 (M = 37.6,
SD = 12.6). We then excluded lineup trials in which these participants had indicated that a
specific video did not play, or they had previously seen the video in another study. Following
this exclusion, we had 12,438 observations. Our final a priori exclusion criterion eliminated
lineup trials in which participants had made an identification faster than 200 ms, which only
removed one observation. Thus, our Session 1 analyses were based on 12,437 observations.
Only 665 of Session 1 participants completed Session 2. They received $5.00 for their
participation in Session 2. We excluded 19 participants who had technical issues, did not
complete the entire experiment, or had failed attention checks (see the Procedure section for
details about the specific attention checks). Of the remaining 646 participants, 18 of them either
skipped or did not follow the instruction for the WAIS vocabulary task. Any of our Session 2
analyses that involved the WAIS vocabulary task will not include these participants.
Furthermore, of the 646 participants, 7 participants’ Session 2 data could not be matched up with
their Session 1 data because they submitted an incorrect ID during Session 2. Therefore, for our
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analyses involving Session 2 data, we will indicate the number of observations or participants
when necessary.

3.1.2 Materials
Eyewitness Videos and Lineups. The eyewitness stimuli consisted of twelve different
sets (videos and lineups) developed by various eyewitness researchers (see Appendix A). Each
set of materials includes a video of a mock crime and an array of lineup photos (a guilty suspect
photo and a pool of filler photos). For each set, we constructed two six-person lineups: a targetpresent lineup and a target-absent lineup. The target-present lineup consisted of the guilty suspect
and five fillers, and the target-absent lineup consisted of six fillers. For both target-present and
target-absent lineups, the fillers were randomly drawn from the pool of available fillers as
provided by the original creator(s) of the material set and were unique for each subject. In other
words, the number of available filler photos varied across material sets. For each set of
eyewitness materials, participants only received one of two lineup versions (i.e., a target-present
or a target-absent lineup). The fillers for each lineup were randomly drawn from their respective
filler pool at the time of the task. That is, if both Participants A and B are given a target-absent
lineup from Material Set 1, they may each receive a completely different array of six filler
photos. All lineups were presented in the simultaneous lineup format.
In addition to the eyewitness task, participants also five completed additional tasks: the
Eyewitness Metamemory Scale (EMS, Saraiva et al., 2019), the Cambridge Face Memory Test
(Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006), a Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lineup task, a general
knowledge test, a vocabulary test taken from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, and the
Glasgow Face Matching Test.
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Eyewitness Metamemory Scale (EMS). The EMS is a 23-item questionnaire for
assessing self-ratings of face recognition ability and uses of strategies to encode faces (Saraiva et
al., 2019). According to Saraiva and colleagues, the EMS assesses people’s self-rated face
recognition ability and their use of strategies for encoding faces. The 23-item questionnaire can
be found in Appendix B. The EMS has three factors: Memory Contentment (e.g., My ability to
remember faces is much better than other people's ability to remember faces.), Memory
Discontentment (e.g., My ability to correctly remember where and when I saw a particular face
has deteriorated over time), and Memory Strategies (e.g., I often create a visual image in my
mind of a face that I want to remember.). The inclusion of the EMS was to evaluate its utility in
differentiating accurate from inaccurate witnesses.
Cambridge Face Matching Test (CFMT). To measure general face recognition ability,
we administered the CFMT. Participants had to memorize six faces in three different
orientations, and then they were asked to identify previously seen faces from an array of three
faces (a target face and two foils). There was a total of 72 test trials. These test trials become
progressively more difficult as image noises are added to the later trials. CFMT scores range
from 0 to 72. The CFMT can be requested via https://www.testable.org/library.
Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) Lineup Task. The DRM lineup task was taken
from Finley, Wixted, and Roediger (2020), which was based on original work by Deese (1959)
and Roediger and McDermott (1995). Participants were shown a series of word lists followed by
test trials for those wordlists. The test trial was the same as that of the eyewitness task except
those words were shown instead of photos. Both target-present and target-absent word lineups
were used. For each test trial, participants were asked to identify the word they had previously
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seen from the respective word list or to say that it was not in the list. There were two study-test
blocks. For each study-test block, participants first viewed eight wordlists (10 words in each list)
followed by eight test trials (half target-present and half target-absent). Due to a programming
error in this task, the number of target-present and target-absent lineups was not always even.
Similar to the eyewitness task, participants were asked to rate their confidence following their
identification decision on a 100-point scale. These materials are in Appendix C.
General Knowledge Task. The general knowledge task consisted of questions taken
from Tauber et al. (2013)’s general knowledge norms. We chose 30 questions with varying
levels of difficulty. Each question could be answered with a single word (e.g., What is the
longest river in South America? Answer: Amazon). Along with their response to each general
knowledge question, participants also provided a confidence rating from a 100-point scale. The
30 items are provided in Appendix D.
Vocabulary Test. The vocabulary test was a subtest from the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale (WAIS). Participants were shown 25 words, and they were asked to define
each of the words in their own words. They typed the definitions in the textbox below each word.
Because the WAIS is a propriety instrument, we could not include the list of words and its
scoring instructions in the present paper.
Glasgow Face Matching Test (GFMT). Participants were asked to determine whether
two simultaneously presented faces depicted the same person (Burton, White, & McNeill, 2010).
There were 40 trials (20 same-person trials and 20 different-person trials). Following each
response, participants were asked to rate their level of confidence from a 100-point scale. The
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GFMT can be found at https://sites.google.com/site/mikeburtonfacelab/glasgow-face-matchingtest.

3.1.3 Design
For Experiment 1, we used a within-subject design. The lineup type variable for the eyewitness
task was manipulated within-subjects, such that, half of the 12 lineups were target-present, and
half were target-absent. The order of the videos and lineups was randomized.
Experiment 1 consisted of two sessions. In Session 1, participants completed the EMS,
the eyewitness task, and the CFMT. In Session 2, they completed the EMS, the DRM lineup
task, a general knowledge test, a vocabulary test from the WAIS, and the GFMT.

3.1.4 Procedure
Session 1. All subjects were tested online. Following the consent process, participants
were answered a few demographic questions (sex, age, ethnicity, and education), then they
completed the EMS. Next, they were given instructions about the eyewitness task. They were
told the following: “In the next task, you will be shown an image or video followed by a photo
array. Your job is to identify the previously seen face. The photo array may or may not contain
the previously seen face. If the face is in the photo array, please click on that face. If the face is
NOT in the photo array, please choose the ‘Not Present’ option. Following your identification
decision, you will be asked to rate your level of confidence in your decision. We will start with
two practice trials. Please pay attention.” To ensure understanding of the instructions,
participants were given two training trials. In each practice trial, they saw a smiley face followed
by a lineup of different smiley faces. One of the practice trials was a target-present lineup and the
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other was a target-absent lineup. If participants failed to answer both practice trials, the
experiment automatically terminated.
After participants had completed the training trials, they moved on to the eyewitness task.
For the eyewitness task, participants first watched one of the twelve videos followed by three
questions: 1) Did you have any issues with the video?, 2) Have you seen this video before?, and
an attention check question specific to the video (e.g., What did the suspect steal? What was the
victim doing before the crime occurred? What color sweater was the perpetrator wearing?).
Although we did not exclude any identification trial if participants answered the attention check
question incorrectly, the experiment automatically terminated if participants answered 4 or more
attention check questions incorrectly. The order of the eyewitness material sets was randomized.
After answering those post-video questions, participants were shown a six-person simultaneous
lineup and they were asked to identify the suspect that they previously saw in the video by
clicking on the face of that suspect or to reject the lineup by clicking on the “Not Present”
option. After they made their identification decision, they were then asked to provide a
confidence judgment by moving the slider on the 100-pt scale (0 = not confident at all; 100 =
completely confident). This process was repeated for all twelve videos. Following the eyewitness
task, participants completed the CFMT. Participants were told to respond with keypresses (1, 2,
or 3). There were 72 test trials for the CFMT. Three attention-check trials (i.e., a prompt about
which key to press) were added to these 72 test trials (a total of 75 trials in this section). If
participants failed to answer more than one of these attention-check trials incorrectly, the
experiment automatically terminated. Then, participants were reminded to complete Session 2.
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Session 2. Participants were asked to complete the EMS again. Next, participants
received instructions on the upcoming DRM lineup task. Like the eyewitness task, they received
two practice trials. Similarly, if participants failed to answer both practice trials, the experiment
automatically terminated. Next, they then completed two study-test blocks. The test trials were
presented in the same order as the word lists. Upon completing the DRM lineup task, participants
were told that they would answer a series of general knowledge questions by typing their
responses into a textbox and providing confidence ratings for their responses using a confidence
scale. There were 30 general knowledge questions/trials. Two attention-check trials (i.e., a
prompt about a specific word to type into the textbox) were also added to this general knowledge
task (a total of 32 trials in this section). If participants failed to answer one of these attentioncheck trials incorrectly, the experiment automatically terminated. Once they have completed the
general knowledge questions, they were given the 25-item vocabulary test. Participants saw each
word one at a time and they were asked to describe each word by typing in the textbox provided.
No confidence rating was required for this task. Next, participants were asked to complete the
GFMT. Similar to the DRM lineup and general knowledge tasks, participants were also asked to
provide confidence ratings for their responses. There were 40 GFMT trials. Two attention-check
trials (i.e., participants had to determine whether two simultaneously presented smiley faces are
the same) were also added to the GFMT task (a total of 42 trials in this section). Lastly,
participants were then debriefed about the purpose of the experiment.
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3.2 Results
In the next sections, we will first present results from our primary analyses for our Experiment 1
objectives followed by results from our exploratory analyses of other individual difference
factors.

3.2.1 CFMT Performance and Identification Performance Across Materials
Figure 7 shows the distribution of CFMT scores in Experiment 1 (M = 54.28, SD = 10.24).
Table 1 shows the proportions of identification responses across twelve sets of eyewitness
materials. Because we did not use a designated innocent suspect in any of the materials, Table 1
did not have a column for innocent suspect identifications.

Figure 7. Depicts the distribution of CFMT scores. The blue line represents the mean CFMT
score.
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Table 1
The proportions of identification responses in Experiment 1 as a function of lineups.
The lineups are ordered by d' scores (on the far right) from low to high.
Materials
Type
Suspect
Filler
Not Present
N
TP
0.28
0.37
0.34
534
Mickes-Laptop
TA
0.54
0.46
509
TP
0.35
0.40
0.25
518
Mickes-Purse
TA
0.62
0.38
526
TP
0.34
0.20
0.46
511
Mickes-Hispanic
TA
0.36
0.64
530
TP
0.50
0.30
0.20
542
Clark
TA
0.69
0.31
502
TP
0.54
0.26
0.20
541
Horry-Drug
TA
0.59
0.41
494
TP
0.59
0.16
0.25
506
Wixted
TA
0.52
0.48
519
TP
0.54
0.06
0.39
485
Brewer
TA
0.23
0.77
550
TP
0.68
0.12
0.20
526
BL-David
TA
0.41
0.59
517
TP
0.76
0.11
0.13
509
Mickes-White-M
TA
0.46
0.54
526
TP
0.81
0.09
0.10
498
Horry-Shoplift
TA
0.51
0.49
522
TP
0.91
0.06
0.04
532
Mickes-White-F
TA
0.62
0.38
505
TP
0.86
0.07
0.07
529
BL-Thomas
TA
0.40
0.60
506
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d′
0.77
0.88
1.14
1.20
1.39
1.60
1.89
1.95
2.15
2.24
2.58
2.60

It is clear from Table 1 that eyewitness stimuli used in past research vary widely in
difficulty. The guilty suspect ID rate ranges from .28 to .91, whereas the target-absent filler ID
rate ranges from .23 to .69. Each set of material also produced different combinations of guilty
suspect ID rate and target-absent filler ID rate. For each set of eyewitness stimuli, we used d′ as a
measure of material difficulty. For each material, we calculated the d′ value using an estimated
false alarm rate because we did not use a designated innocent suspect. We calculated our
estimated false alarm rate by dividing the number of target-absent fillers by 6. The d′ values
ranged from .77 to 2.60, suggesting that participants performed well with some eyewitness
materials but more poorly with others. Given the amount of variability across materials, are these
differences enough to reduce the strength of the eyewitness confidence-accuracy relationship and
suspect-ID accuracy for high-confidence (90-100% confidence) identifications? We will address
this question in the next section.

3.2.2 Primary Analyses and Analytic Methods
For our primary analyses, we were interested in the effects of material difficulty and individual
differences in face recognition ability on the confidence-accuracy relationship. We examined the
confidence-accuracy relationship using the CAC approach. CAC plots were constructed for the
aggregate of twelve material sets, by each material set, by material difficulty group, and by
CFMT groups (details about grouping will be discussed in later sections). The number of
identification responses for each plot can be found in Appendix E. The CAC calculation (i.e.,
suspect-ID accuracy) was computed for each of the five confidence bins separately (0-29, 30-49,
50-69, 70-89, and 90-100). We also calculated the average confidence based on the identification
responses in each confidence bin, which serves as the expected accuracy level associated with
responses for that confidence bin (assuming a perfect correspondence between confidence and
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accuracy). Here, we used the bootstrap method to generate the error bars around each suspect-ID
accuracy value and to compare across different conditions.
We chose the bootstrap approach over a mixed-effect model approach because the
purpose of the present study was to address applied questions. Our goal was to assess accuracy in
terms of suspect-ID accuracy using the CAC approach. Unlike the bootstrap approach, the
mixed-effect model approach cannot directly calculate a suspect-ID accuracy value if there is no
designated innocent suspect. The CAC calculation is suspect-ID accuracy = suspect IDs /
(suspect IDs + (target-absent filler IDs / the lineup size) when there is no designated innocent
suspect. This calculation is easily computed using the bootstrap approach, but the mixed-effect
model approach cannot divide the number of target-absent filler IDs by the lineup size. Studies
that had used the mixed-effect model approach had to resort to a proxy suspect-ID accuracy
measure in which all target-absent filler IDs are treated errors without the lineup size adjustment
component of the formula (see Gettleman et al., 2020; Grabman et al., 2019). Because we
wanted to measure directly suspect-ID accuracy instead of using a proxy measure, the bootstrap
approach is more appropriate for the present study. In the following sections, we outlined our
bootstrap procedures for unaggregated and aggregated data.
Bootstrap Procedure for Unaggregated Data. One example of analyses involving
unaggregated data is a CAC plot of a single material set. Each participant either received a
target-present or target-absent version of the lineup for an individual material set and therefore,
each participant could only contribute at most one observation for that material set. Because the
CAC calculation excludes identification responses such as target-present filler IDs and “Not
Present” responses in both target-present and target-absent conditions (i.e., non-CAC relevant
responses), some participants’ only identification response may not be included at all in this type
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of analysis if it happened to be a non-CAC relevant response. Since each observation came from
an independent source (i.e., one participant), the independence assumption for the bootstrap
method is met. Thus, for unaggregated data, our bootstrap procedure simply resampled from all
the available observations, and this process was repeated for 10,000 bootstrap replicates to
produce a 95% Bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) bootstrap CIs for each confidence bin.
Bootstrap Procedure for Aggregated Data. Some examples of analyses involving
aggregated data are the aggregate CAC plot of all twelve material sets or the CAC plot
comparing different CFMT groups. In these analyses, participants could contribute one or more
observations (i.e., one lineup identification response per material set). For instance, if
participants A and B scored a 54 on the CFMT, they are placed in the same CFMT group.
Participant A could provide two CAC-relevant ID responses and Participant B could provide
seven CAC-relevant ID responses. If the same bootstrap approach for unaggregated data is
applied to aggregated data, then each observation in the aggregated data would be treated as
though it came from a separate participant, which was not the case. In other words, the major
concern for bootstrap analyses of aggregated data is the independence assumption (i.e., each
observation in the original sample should come from an independent source). To address this
issue, we considered three different bootstrap approaches for dealing with aggregated data1: 1)
nested bootstrap, 2) unique-subject-observation bootstrap, and 3) stratified bootstrap.
Nested Bootstrap. The nested bootstrap approach involves taking all the observations
(i.e., Level 1 data) from each participant and nesting them under each respective participant (i.e.,
Level 2 data), then to sample with replacement at Level 2 in which each participant is
independent of other participants. After the resampling process, the nested data would then be

1

I want to thank Mike Strube for suggesting different bootstrap procedure ideas for aggregated data.
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unnested to perform the CAC calculation. Although the resampling process satisfies the
independence assumption, it is important to consider the type(s) of analyses that would be
performed on each set of resampled data. Unlike statistical tests such as regression or mixedeffect models, the CAC formula does not include a component that handles the within-subject
nature of our present data. If there is no mechanism to account for the within-subject component,
then one potential concern is that the computed statistic may be biased, especially given that each
participant could vary in the number of CAC-relevant responses they could contribute. Returning
to our earlier example, Participant A’s two CAC-relevant ID responses could be for two lineups
from difficult material sets, whereas Participant B’s seven CAC-relevant ID responses could be
for seven lineups from easy material sets. Because the nested data must be unnested to perform
the CAC calculation, the computed statistic (suspect-ID accuracy) may be more reflective of
participants such as Participant B who simply provided more CAC responses. Said differently,
upon unnesting, the CAC calculation may not be adequately accounted for the underlying
differences in performance across material sets with varying difficulty levels.
Unique-Subject-Observation Bootstrap. With the unique-subject-observation bootstrap
approach, each participant can only contribute at most one observation in each bootstrap
replicate. This filtering process can be applied following one of two resampling procedures. The
first method is to use the same resampling procedure as the nested bootstrap approach, then the
filter process is applied after the bootstrap data becomes unnested. The second method is to
resample the data without nesting all observations under each respective participant, then the
filter process is applied to the bootstrap data. Both methods can achieve the same result (i.e., one
observation per participant), but the second method tends to produce data based on slightly larger
sample sizes than the first method. The benefit of the unique-subject-observation approach is that
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the CAC calculation is be based on independent observations because each participant could
only contribute at most one observation. The obvious downside of this approach is the significant
reduction in sample sizes compared to other bootstrap approaches. Due to the smaller sample
sizes and more variable data, BCa CIs were often unstable. Although basic and percentile
bootstrap CIs can be calculated, these types of CIs are less reliable than BCa CIs. Moreover, like
the nested bootstrap approach, this approach also ignores any potential differences in
performance across material sets.
Stratified Bootstrap. Unlike the basic bootstrap procedure, the stratified bootstrap
procedure resamples strata separately (in our case, individual material sets) while maintaining
their original proportions. For simplicity’s sake, let’s assume we want to calculate the aggregate
CAC of two material sets. Material A has 30 observations (10 suspect IDs, 5 False IDs, and 15
“Not Present” IDs) and Material B has 50 observations (20 suspect IDs, 20 False IDs, and 10
“Not Present” IDs). The stratified bootstrap process will always draw 30 observations for
Material A and 50 observations for Material B, but the proportions of different ID responses
within Material A and Material B will vary with each sampling iteration. For instance, one
bootstrap replicate may consist of 30 observations of Material A (12 suspect IDs, 8 False IDs,
and 10 “Not Present” IDs) and 50 observations of Material B (25 suspect IDs, 18 False IDs, and
7 “Not Present” IDs). As we have described earlier, participants could at most provide one
response for each material set because they either received a target-present or target-absent
lineup of that material set. Given that the stratified bootstrap procedure performs the resampling
process for each material set individually, the independence assumption is met.
Since a separate CAC calculation is performed on each material set separately (i.e., a
separate suspect-ID accuracy value for each material set), a weighted average of these accuracy
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values can be computed. The weight of each material set is based on the number of CACrelevant responses that contributed to the CAC calculation for each material set. These weights
are dynamic such that they adjust according to the number of CAC-relevant responses in each
material set within each bootstrap replicate. Therefore, the combination of stratified
bootstrapping and the dynamic weighted average calculation method satisfies the bootstrap
method’s independence assumption and provides a weighted statistic that better accounts for
underlying differences in performance across material sets.
Through our testing of these approaches, the nested bootstrap approach and the stratified
bootstrap (with dynamic weighted average) approach produced similar results; however, the
former tended to produce more significant findings than the latter. Here, we opted to report the
results based on the stratified bootstrap approach in the Results section because it satisfies both
the bootstrap method’s independence assumption, and also provides a weighted statistic. We did
not consider the unique-subject-observation bootstrap approach because BCa CIs could not be
estimated for a majority of our analyses.
Significance Testing. To determine whether if two conditions were significantly
different from each other, we computed a bootstrap CI of the contrast between those two
conditions (e.g., Condition A - Condition B). Here, we repeated this process for 10,000 bootstrap
replicates, then we constructed a 95% bootstrap CI around the difference. If the 95% bootstrap
CI of the contrast does not include zero, the difference is significant. For comparisons of more
than two conditions, we adjusted our CI using the following formula: 1 – corrected p-value. For
example, if there are three comparisons, the CI is 98.3% because 1-(.05/3) = .983. In this case,
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the difference is significant if the 98.3% CI does not include zero2. Again, unless stated
otherwise, our results were based on 10,000 bootstrap replicates and BCa bootstrap CIs. All
bootstrap analyses were conducted using the boot R package (Canty & Ripley, 2021) and plots
were constructed using the ggplot2 R package (Wickham, 2016).

3.2.3 The Effects of Material Difficulty on the Confidence-Accuracy
Relationship
Aggregate CAC. Figure 8A shows the confidence-accuracy relationship aggregated across
twelve material sets. Consistent with prior studies, we observed a positive confidence-accuracy
relationship. High confidence was associated with high accuracy. The distance between the CAC
curve and the diagonal line was smaller in the upper end than the lower end of the confidence
scale. On one hand, identification responses with a confidence rating of 90-100 yielded an
accuracy of 96.0% (95% bootstrap CI [95.3%, 96.8%]). On the other hand, confidence ratings
below 50 had an accuracy level well above 50%, suggesting participants were underconfident in
the lower confidence bins. Our aggregate CAC curve resembles the CAC curve reported in the
Wixted et al.’s (2016) CAC plot (see Figure 8B), which consisted of 456 target-present and 452
target-absent simultaneous lineups from an experimentally controlled field study. However, as
we have alluded to earlier, the confidence-accuracy relationship may be different depending on
the difficulty of the eyewitness stimuli.

2

Although we reported 98.3% CI in writing, we did not round the adjusted CI in our bootstrap analyses. Any
bootstrap analyses that involved a 98.3% CI was actually based on a 98.3333333333% CI.
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Figure 8. Figure 8A shows the aggregate CAC plot of all twelve material sets in Experiment 1.
Error bars represent 95% BCa bootstrap confidence intervals. Figure 8B shows the CAC plot
from Wixted et al. (2016), which consisted of 456 target-present and 452 target-absent
simultaneous lineups from an experimentally controlled field study.
Individual Material Set CAC. Figure 9 shows the confidence-accuracy relationship for
each of the 12 material sets. We ordered these plots by the material’s d′ value (see Table 1). The
confidence-accuracy relationship was poorer for materials with lower than higher d′ values. In
fact, the first four material sets (Mickes-Laptop, Mickes-Purse, Mickes-Hispanic, and Clark) had
an accuracy level that dipped below the diagonal line in the 90-100 confidence bin. Given that all
four 90-100 confidence bins had 95% confidence intervals were below the diagonal line, it
suggests that individuals were significantly overconfident in the accuracy of their identification
in these four material sets. These four sets of materials also showed lower accuracy levels
compared to the remaining eight sets of materials at the 90-100 confidence level; in other words,
individuals were overconfident about their identification performance in these four sets of
materials compared to the remaining eight sets of materials. These results suggest that accuracy
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for high-confidence identifications (confidence ratings of 90-100) can vary. For the 90-100
confidence bin, accuracy ranged from 78.9% (Mickes-Laptop) to 99.0% (Mickes-White-F).

Figure 9. (continued)
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Figure 9. Twelve CAC plots for the twelve material sets. Error bars represent 95% BCa
bootstrap confidence intervals.
D′ Conditions. One might argue that these differences in the confidence-accuracy
relationship are simply due to an adequate number of observations in a specific material set;
however, given the within-subject nature of the experiment, all participants saw all 12 materials
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and had the same number of opportunities (excluding trials/observations eliminated due to
technical issues or prior exposure to a specific set of stimuli in another study) to make an
identification for each material set. Nevertheless, we can aggregate across materials to increase
stability in the CAC function. Because we used d′ as a measure of material difficulty, we
assigned a d′ value of 1.5 or below as the criterion for a low d′ condition, and those with a d′
value greater than 1.5 as the criterion as the high d′ condition. The low d′ condition consisted of
the following material sets: Mickes-Laptop, Mickes-Purse, Mickes-Hispanic, Clark, and HorryDrug. The high d′ condition consisted of the following material sets: Wixted, Brewer, BL-David,
Mickes-White-M, Horry-Shoplift, Mickes-White-F, and BL-Thomas. It is important to note that
our criteria for high versus low d′ conditions were not based on prior studies; we simply used a
rough cutoff based on the range of d′ values of twelve material sets.
We constructed CAC plots for the two d′ conditions (see Figure 10). Although the high
and low d′ conditions did not differ in suspect-ID accuracy in the two lower confidence bins (029% and 30-49%), they differed in the other three confidence bins (50-69, 70-89, and 90-100).
The low d′ condition was significantly less accurate than the high d′ condition in the 50-69
confidence bin (81.4% vs 87.1%, -5.7% difference in accuracy, 95% CI [-8.5%, -3.0%]) and the
70-89 confidence bin (85.7% vs. 93.6%, -7.9% difference in accuracy, 95% CI [-10.4%, -5.4%])
and the 90-100 confidence bin (87.3% vs 97.7%, -10.4% difference in accuracy, 95% CI [14.2%, -6.8%]). These results suggest that the material difficulty (i.e., material effect) can
significantly influence the confidence-accuracy relationship, even affecting the reliability of the
accuracy level associated with high-confidence identifications (i.e., the 90-100 confidence bin).
However, it is worth noting that a majority of the high-confidence ID responses were associated
with high accuracy, as shown by the larger point on the high d′ CAC curve.
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Figure 10. A CAC plot of the high and low d′ conditions. The error bars represent 95% BCa
bootstrap confidence intervals. The size of each point is based on the number of ID responses.

3.2.4 The Effects of Face Recognition Ability on the Confidence-Accuracy
Relationship
To examine the influence of face recognition ability on the confidence-accuracy relationship, we
divided our participants into three groups based on their CFMT scores: Low CFMT (scores <
45), Medium CFMT (scores 45-64), and High CFMT (scores > 64). High and Low CFMT
groups correspond to one standard deviation (SD = 10.2) above and below the mean (M = 54.3),
respectively. Our results were based on 25,000 bootstrap replicates. Figure 11 shows the CAC
plot of the three CFMT groups. All three CFMT groups produced similar accuracy values across
all confidence bins except the fourth confidence bin (70-89). For the fourth confidence bin (7059

89), the Medium CFMT and High CFMT groups (91.8% and 93.7%, respectively) were similarly
accurate, but the Low CFMT group (85.2%) was less accurate than the Medium CFMT group
(85.2% vs. 91.8%, -6.6% difference in accuracy, 98.3% CI [-10.8%, -1.9%]) and the High CFMT
group (85.2% vs. 93.7%, -8.9% difference in accuracy, 98.3% CI [-13.6%, -3.5%]). Again, there
was no difference in accuracy between the Medium CFMT and High CFMT groups for the 70-89
confidence bin. More importantly, there were no significant differences in accuracy across all
three CFMT groups (92.9%, 96.3%, and 96.5%, respectively) in the 90-100 confidence bin. In
other words, regardless of face recognition ability, participants were equally accurate when they
made high confidence identifications.

Figure 11. CAC curves were constructed for the three CFMT groups. The error bars represent
95% BCa bootstrap confidence intervals.
Face Recognition Ability and Material Difficulty. Next, we examined whether the face
recognition ability interacts with material difficulty. To answer this question, we constructed
based on CFMT and d′ categories we used in the previous sections. Figure 12 shows the CAC
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curves of the three CFMT groups in the Low and High d′ conditions separately. For the Low d′
condition, all three CFMT groups performed similarly across confidence bins except for the
fourth confidence bin (70-89). The Low CFMT group was significantly less accurate than the
Medium CFMT group (68.0% vs. 86.4%, -18.4% difference in accuracy, 98.3% CI [-32.5%, 4.4%]) and the High CFMT group (68.0% vs. 91.1%, -23.1% difference in accuracy, 98.3% CI [37.8, -6.6]). There was no difference in accuracy between the Medium and High CFMT groups.
In the High d′ condition, all three CFMT groups were similarly accurate across confidence bins
except for the fourth confidence bin (70-89). However, only the difference between the Low and
High CFMT groups reached significance (91.1% vs. 95.4%, -4.3% difference in accuracy, 98.3%
CI [-7.7%, -0.8%]). In short, both good and poor face recognizers were similarly accurate in their
high confidence identifications (confidence ratings of 90-100), but all CFMT groups were
generally more accurate when the material set was easy than when it was difficult.

Figure 12. The CAC curves of CFMT groups were plotted as a function of d′ conditions. The
error bars represent 95% BCa bootstrap confidence intervals.
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3.2.5 High-Confidence Identification Thresholds
On a 100-point scale, any identification responses with a confidence rating of 90-100 are
typically considered as high-confidence identifications. Here, we compared accuracy associated
with the conservative 90-100 confidence bin to accuracy associated with more liberal confidence
bins such as 70-100 and 80-100. We examined these three confidence thresholds accounting for
both the effects of material difficulty and face recognition ability. To compare across conditions,
we computed 95% bootstrap confidence intervals.
Figure 13 shows the accuracy levels associated with the three confidence thresholds
conditioned by d′ conditions and CFMT groups. Regardless of CFMT groups, all three
confidence thresholds generally produced higher suspect-ID accuracy in the high d′ than low d′
conditions. For easy material sets (i.e., the high d′ condition) with a 90-100 confidence threshold,
the Low, Medium, and High CFMT groups did not differ in suspect-ID accuracy levels (95.9%,
97.9%, and 98.2%, respectively). With an 80-100 confidence threshold, the Low CFMT group
became less accurate than the High CFMT groups (94.9% vs. 97.9%, a -3.0% difference in
accuracy, 98.3% CI [-5.4%, -1.0%]). Similarly, when the confidence threshold was set to 70-100,
the Low CFMT group became less accurate than both the Medium CFMT group (93.3% vs.
95.8%, -2.6% difference in accuracy, 98.3% CI [-4.4%, -0.7%]) and the High CFMT group
(93.3% vs. 97.1%, -3.8% difference in accuracy, 98.3% CI [-5.8%, -1.9%]). In addition, the
Medium CFMT group was also less accurate than the High CFMT group (95.8% vs. 97.1%, a 1.3% difference in accuracy, 98.3% CI [-2.5%, -0.1%]) with a 70-100 confidence threshold. For
the difficult material sets (i.e., the low d′ condition), all three CFMT did not differ in suspect-ID
accuracy levels for both the 90-100% and 80-100% confidence thresholds. With a 70-100
confidence threshold, the Low CFMT groups became significantly less accurate than the
Medium CFMT group (74.2% vs. 87.1%, -12.9% difference in accuracy, 98.3% CI [-24.4%, 62

3.1%]) and the High CFMT group (74.2% vs. 90.6%, -16.4% difference in accuracy, 98.3% CI [28.3%, -5.2%]). In short, a 90-100 confidence threshold ensures that all three CFMT groups
achieved comparable accuracy levels.

Figure 13. Suspect-ID accuracy was computed for three different confidence thresholds
conditioned by material difficulty and face recognition ability. The error bars represent 95% BCa
bootstrap confidence intervals.

3.2.6 Calibration Performance
Next, we were interested in the effects of material difficulty and face recognition on calibration
(i.e., the degree to which the confidence-accuracy relationship deviates from perfect calibration).
To measure calibration, we need to calculate the calibration C index from the calibration
approach. The calibration C index measures the amount of deviation from the diagonal line for
each of the confidence bins. Following Brewer, Keast, and Rishworth (2002), we calculated the
calibration C index as follow: 1) sort identification responses to one of our five confidence bins,
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2) for each confidence bin, we find the difference between mean confidence across the
identification responses and the proportion correct responses (i.e., calibration accuracy from
Equation 1), 3) we squared each of these differences and then multiplied them by the number of
responses within each respective confidence bin, 4) the outcomes from Step 3 were summed
across all confidence bins and then divided them by the total number of responses. The C index
ranges from 0 to 1 (0 = perfect calibration). We calculated a C index for each material set and we
constructed a 95% bootstrap confidence interval for each C index. Figure 14 shows the
calibration C indices for 12 material sets. As you can see that these 12 material sets were indeed
differentially calibrated. These materials were ordered by their d′ values from largest to smallest.
Figure 15 shows a negative correlation between the material sets’ d′ values and their C indices,
r(10) = -.86, p < .001. In other words, people can calibrate themselves better when the material is
easy than when it is difficult.

Figure 14. A calibration C index was calculated for each material set. The error bars represent
95% BCa bootstrap confidence intervals. Materials were ordered from the largest to the smallest
d′ values.
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Figure 15. A scatter plot of the 12 material sets plotted by their d′ values and calibration C
indices.
We also considered whether calibration performance is moderated by both material
difficulty and face recognition. Figure 16A shows the calibration plots for low and high d′
conditions as a function of CFMT groups. Figure 16B shows the C indices for calibration curves
depicted in the top panel. Because some 95% BCa bootstrap CIs were unstable even with 20,000
bootstrap replicates, we reported the results in terms of the basic, percentile, and BCa bootstrap
CIs (see Table 2). Similarly, since some of the 98.3% BCa bootstrap CIs for the contrasts were
also unstable, we also reported the results in terms of the basic, percentile, and BCa bootstrap
CIs (see Table 3).
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Figure 16. The top panel shows the calibration plots and C indices for low and high d′ conditions
as a function of CFMT groups. The error bars represent 95% BCa bootstrap confidence intervals
The bottom panel shows a table for the 95% CIs and the 98.3% contrast CIs.
Table 2
95% confidence intervals for d′ conditions and CFMT groups. Results presented as basic,
percentile, and BCa bootstrap confidence intervals
D′
C
95% Basic
95%
95% BCa
Unstable
Group
Condition
Index
CI
Percentile CI
CI
BCa CI
Low CFMT
0.04
[.02, .04]
[.03, .06]
[.02, .04]
Yes
High
Medium CFMT 0.01
[.01, .02]
[.01, .02]
[.01, .02]
Yes
High CFMT
0.02
[0, .02]
[.02, .04]
[.01, .02]
Yes
Low

Low CFMT
Medium CFMT
High CFMT

0.13
0.06
0.05

[.10, .15]
[.05, .07]
[.02, .06]
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[.12, .16]
[.06, .08]
[.04, .08]

[.10, .15]
[.05, .07]
[.02, .06]

Yes
Yes
No

Table 3
Contrasts across d′ conditions and CFMT groups. Results presented as basic, percentile, and BCa
bootstrap confidence intervals
D′
CFMT
98.3%
98.3%
98.3%
Unstable
Condition
Comparison
Difference Basic CI Percentile CI
BCa CI
BCa CI
Low vs. Medium
.02
[0, .03]
[.01, .04]*
[0, .03]
Yes
High
Low vs. High
.02
[0, .03]
[0, .03]
[0, .04]
No
Medium vs. High
-.01
[-.01, .01]
[-.03, 0]
[-.02, .01]
Yes
Low

Low vs. Medium
Low vs. High
Medium vs. High

.07
.08
.01

[.03, .10]*
[.05, .12]*
[0, .05]

[.04, .11]*
[.04, .12]*
[-.02, .03]

[.04, .10]*
[.05, .12]*
[-.01, .04]

No
No
Yes

Note: An asterisk indicates a significant difference at 98.3% CI level. Due to rounding, some 98.3%
CIs may appear to include a zero because the original values were close to zero.

Overall, participants were generally more calibrated when the material was easy than
when it was difficult. For the low d′ condition, the Low CFMT group was significantly less
calibrated than the Medium and High CFMT groups (see the second table in Figure 16C). For the
high d′ condition, all three CFMT groups showed similar calibration performance. Although it
may appear that the Low CFMT group remained significantly less calibrated than the Medium
CFMT group, the BCa CI for this comparison was unstable. The basic and percentile bootstrap
CI methods also suggested this difference was significant; however, these two bootstrap CI
methods are generally less effective at correcting for biases compared to the BCa bootstrap CI
method. Therefore, these basic and percentile CIs should be interpreted with caution. Overall,
these results suggest that calibration performance is moderated by both material difficulty and
face recognition ability.

3.2.7 Calibration, CAC, and Worst-Case-Scenario Approaches
In this section, we examined the eyewitness confidence-accuracy relationship using three
different approaches: calibration, CAC, and worst-case scenario approaches. Here, we use the
version of the calibration approach that omits all target-present fillers but treats all target-absent
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fillers as errors (Equation 2). The CAC approach divides the number of target-absent filler IDs
by the lineup size (6). For the worst-case scenario approach, we first looked for the most
frequently selected target-absent filler in each set of materials, and then we used this person as
the designated innocent suspect. We included target-absent trials only if this designated innocent
suspect had appeared as one of the choices in the lineup array, and we excluded target-present
trials if this designated innocent suspect was one of the target-present fillers. Through these
steps, we simulated a situation in which the difference between target-present and target-absent
lineups was that the guilty suspect in the target-present lineup was replaced by the designated
innocent suspect in the target-absent lineup.

Figure 17. Three different identification accuracy calculations were performed to construct three
different confidence-accuracy curves (see text for details). Each of these curves represents the
aggregate of twelve material sets. The error bars represent 95% BCa bootstrap confidence
intervals.
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In Figure 17, we presented our data as the aggregate of the twelve material sets for all
three approaches. Again, for the worst-case scenario approach, we designated the most
frequently chosen target-absent filler in each material set to be the designated innocent suspect.
The accuracy calculation for the worst-case scenario approach was simply Guilty Suspect /
(Guilty Suspect + Designated Innocent Suspect). All three approaches produced confidenceaccuracy curves that were significantly different from each other across all five confidence bins.
For the 90-100 confidence bin, the CAC approach produced a significantly higher accuracy value
than both the calibration approach (96.0% vs. 83.0%, 13.0% difference in accuracy, 98.3% CI
[10.5%, 15.9%]) and the worst-case-scenario approach (96.0% vs. 92.2%, 3.8% difference in
accuracy, 98.8% CI [1.4%, 6.7%]). The worst-case scenario approach also produced a higher
accuracy level than the calibration approach (92.2% vs. 83.0%, -9.2% difference in accuracy,
98.3% [-12.7%, -5.6%]) for the 90-100 confidence bin. Therefore, despite our deliberate effort in
choosing the most frequently selected target-absent filler to be the designated innocent suspect,
the worst-case scenario approach still produced a confidence-accuracy curve that is more similar
to the CAC approach than the calibration approach.

3.2.8 Exploratory Analyses
Eyewitness Metamemory Questionnaire (EMS). The EMS was administered at the
beginning of Session 1 and administered again at the beginning of Session 2. By having
participants complete the EMS twice, we were able to assess the test-retest reliability of the
EMS. However, because only a subset of participants completed Session 2, we could only
conduct our test-retest analysis on this subset of participants. The EMS consists of three factors:
Memory Contentment, Memory Discontentment, and Memory Strategies. Our Pearson
correlation revealed significant test-retest correlations for Memory Contentment, r(633) = .84, p
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< .001, Memory Discontentment, r(633) = .74, p < .001, and Memory Strategies, r(633) = .61, p
< .001. Next, we asked if self-report measures of one’s memory are informative of eyewitness
identification accuracy. More specifically, we were interested in suspect-ID accuracy. To answer
this question, we examined if these three categories of scores from the EMS led to differences in
CAC curves (i.e., the confidence-accuracy relationship). We followed Saraiva et al. (2020)’s
analytic approach. For each of the three factors, they created two groups using the 33rd and 66th
percentiles as the criteria for low and high scorers, respectively; they then compute a calibration
curve for each group. Because the present study was interested in suspect-ID accuracy rather
than calibration accuracy, we computed CAC curves instead.
Figure 18 shows CAC curves across three eyewitness metamemory factors. To ensure
that stable BCa bootstrap CIs could be estimated, we organized our data into three confidence
bins: 0-50, 51-89, and 90-100. For Memory Contentment, low and high scorers showed
differences in suspect-ID accuracy in the 0-50 confidence bin (79.8% vs. 70.9%, 8.2% difference
in accuracy, 95% CI [3.4%, 12.1%]) and the 51-89 confidence bin (92.1% vs. 85.3%, 6.9%
difference in accuracy, 95% CI [5.0%, 8.8%]), but there was no difference in accuracy for the
90-100 confidence bin. For Memory Discontentment, low and high scorers were similarly
accurate in the 0-50 confidence bin, but there were differences in suspect-ID accuracy in the 5189 confidence bin (89.6% vs. 86.0%, 3.6% difference in accuracy, 95% CI [1.4%, 5.6%]) and the
90-100 confidence bin (96.5% vs. 90.4%, 6.1% difference in accuracy, 95% CI [2.7%, 9.3%]).
For Memory Strategies, low and high scorers did not differ in accuracy across all three
confidence bins. In short, despite creating comparisons groups based on 33rd and 66th percentiles
across three EMS dimensions, only low and high scorers for the Memory Discontentment factor
differed in suspect-ID accuracy at the 90-100 confidence bin.
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Figure 18. CAC curves were constructed for high and low scorers in each of the three EMS
factors (Memory Contentment, Memory Discontentment, and Memory Strategies). The error
bars represent 95% BCa bootstrap confidence intervals.
GFMT and DRM Lineup Performance. For the following analysis, we examined
whether performance on the GFMT and the DRM lineups predict eyewitness identification
performance. Since recent studies have shown that the CFMT, a test of face recognition, predicts
eyewitness identification performance, we wanted to examine whether the GFMT, a face
matching test, can also predict eyewitness identification performance. Prior studies have shown
that both the CFMT and GFMT are positively correlated, r = .50, (McCaffery, Robertson,
Young, & Burton, 2018); likewise, our present study found a significant positive correlation
between the CFMT and GFMT, r(632) = .46, p <.001. The DRM lineup task was suggested as a
means to assess whether the predictability of CFMT on identification performance could be also
attributed to a general recognition ability.
We used a mixed-effects model approach to examine whether performance on the GFMT
and the DRM lineups predict eyewitness identification performance More specifically, we were
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interested in their ability to predict the accuracy of lineup choosers (i.e., those who pick someone
from a lineup) and thus, our dependent variable was chooser accuracy (0 = incorrect; 1 =
correct). Here, we want to differentiate this chooser accuracy calculation from our CAC
calculation in the previous sections. Because we did not employ the designated innocent suspect
approach for our lineup procedure, the CAC approach would require us to divide the number of
target-absent fillers by the lineup size (in our case, 6). However, this step cannot be done in a
mixed-effects model framework. Therefore, we kept the target-absent fillers in our model. This
analytic method was also done in both Grabman et al. (2019) and Gettleman et al. (2020).
We first fit a full model in which we include all the interaction and main effect terms,
then we worked backward in a stepwise fashion; we eliminated terms using the Akaike’s
Information Criterion (AIC) if removing that specific term improves AIC. This process was
repeated until we had reached a parsimonious model. Our fixed effect terms were: Confidence,
CFMT, DRM, and GFMT, and they were also centered and scaled in this model. Our earlier
model also included the fixed effect term WAIS (vocabulary test scores), but this term did not
improve the model, and therefore, it was removed in favor of a parsimonious model. The random
intercepts were participants (subjectID) and lineup materials (lineupName). Because the GFMT
and DRM lineup tasks were Session 2 tasks and only a subset of participants had completed
Session 2, this model was based on identification performance from 633 participants. The final
model for this analysis was: accuracy ~ confidence+cfmt+gfmt+drm+drm:gfmt + (1
|subjectID)+(1|lineupName). A model without the interaction between GFTM and DRM was
significantly worse than a model with this term included, χ2(1) = 6.36, p = 0.01. In this final
model, there was a main effect of confidence, β = .79, z = 15.56, p <.001, a main effect of CFMT
scores, β = .09, z = 2.24, p =.02, a main effect of GFMT score, β = .18, z = 4.23, p <.001, and an
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interaction between GFMT and DRM performance, β = .09, z = 2.52, p =.01. There was no main
effect of DRM performance. Figure 19 shows the interaction between GFMT and DRM.
Although we expected confidence, CFMT, and GFMT to be predictive of chooser accuracy for
eyewitness lineup identification, we were surprised to see an interaction between GFMT and
DRM. However, there was no main effect of DRM on chooser accuracy. It appeared that
individuals who performed well on the GFMT and DRM lineups tended to be more accurate on
the eyewitness identification task, whereas those who performed poorly on the GFMT but
performed well on the DRM lineups were slightly less accurate on the eyewitness identification
task. In other words, individuals who did well on the DRM lineup were no more accurate on the
eyewitness lineup task if they had poor face-matching abilities.

Figure 19. A plot for the interaction between GFMT and DRM lineup performance predicting
chooser accuracy.
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Calibration Across Tasks: For our last exploratory analysis, we were interested in
whether individuals’ tendency to be under-or over-confident is a domain-specific or domaingeneral phenomenon. For this specific analysis, we chose to examine the degree of
calibration/miscalibration across four tasks: eyewitness identification (M = .57, SD = .17)3,
DRM lineup (M = .57, SD = .21), general knowledge (M = .65, SD = .18), and face matching
tasks (M = .85, SD = .11). One way to measure the degree of miscalibration for each task is to
calculate a bias index. The bias index formula is mean confidence – percent correct. It ranges
from -1 to 1 (under-confidence and overconfidence, respectively), and zero means perfect
calibration. If the interest is simply the magnitude of the miscalibration rather than its direction,
then the bias index can be converted to the overconfidence index by taking the absolute value of
the bias index. Here, we examined correlations between tasks in terms of the bias index, the
overconfidence index, and accuracy across the four tasks. We used the GGally R package
(Schloerke et al., 2021) to display our results. Figures 20-22 show a matrix of plots for accuracy
values, bias indices, and overconfidence indices, respectively4. For each matrix, the lower-left
side shows the scatter plots, the diagonal shows the distribution of the measure, and the upperright side shows the correlations.

3

For the eyewitness identification task, we counted guilty suspect identifications from target-present lineups and
“Not Present” responses from target-absent lineups as correct responses. Likewise, for the DRM lineups, we counted
target word identifications from target-present lineups and “Not Present” responses from target-absent lineups as
correct responses. We then correlated across these four tasks for the 639 participants who completed all four tasks in
Sessions 1 and 2.
4
Outliers were included in these correlations reported here. However, our results were similar when these outliers
were excluded from the analyses.
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Figure 20. Correlations of accuracy values (proportion correct) across the four tasks: eyewitness
identification, DRM, GFMT, and general knowledge. The lower-left side shows the scatter plots,
the diagonal shows the distribution of accuracy values, and the upper-right side shows the
correlations.
Accuracy. There were small but significant correlations between accuracy values across
the four tasks, ranging from .08 to .27. Tasks from similar domains tended to produce higher
correlations than tasks from different domains. For instance, the correlation between the
eyewitness identification task and the GFMT was larger than the correlation between the
eyewitness identification task and the DRM lineup task (.27 vs. .08). The general knowledge task
was weakly correlated with the DRM lineup task, r(637) = .23; however, since both of these
tasks do not involve face abilities, we expected them to correlate even more poorly with face
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tasks such as the eyewitness task and the GFMT. This appeared to be the case. The correlation
between the general knowledge task and the eyewitness identification task was not significant.
The general knowledge task and the GFMT was weakly associated, r(637) = .11. Similarly, this
was true for the correlation between the GFMT and the DRM lineup, r(637) = .17. In short, all
four tasks were weakly associated with each other in terms of accuracy, but similar tasks tend to
produce slightly higher correlations than dissimilar tasks.
Bias and Overconfidence Indices. For the bias indices, all four tasks showed small to
moderate correlations between .40-.49, p < .001, but there were no discernable patterns (see
Figure 21). For instance, DRM lineups (a word task) and the GFMT (a face task) showed a
correlation of .49; the eyewitness identification task (a face task) and the GFMT (a face task)
showed a correlation of .47. Likewise, this is true for the overconfidence indices (see Figure 22).
The correlation between the general knowledge and eyewitness identification task was similar to
the correlation between the GFMT and the eyewitness identification task. Surprisingly, the
largest correlation for overconfidence indices was between the general knowledge task and the
GFMT. Overall, correlations of bias indices tended to be larger than those of overconfidence
indices because, unlike the overconfidence indices, the bias indices measure not only the
magnitude of the miscalibration but also the direction of the miscalibration. In other words, some
individuals were generally underconfident about their performance (i.e., negative bias indices),
whereas others were overconfident about their performance (i.e., positive bias indices)5.

5

We also conducted a K-means cluster analysis to detect clusters of underconfident and overconfident individuals
(see Appendix F).
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Figure 21. Correlations of bias indices across the four tasks: eyewitness identification, DRM,
GFMT, and general knowledge. The lower-left side shows the scatter plots, the diagonal shows
the distribution of the bias indices, and the upper-right side shows the correlations.
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Figure 22. Correlations of overconfidence indices across the four tasks: eyewitness
identification, DRM, GFMT, and general knowledge. The lower-left side shows the scatter plots,
the diagonal shows the distribution of the overconfidence indices, and the upper-right side shows
the correlations.

3.3 Discussion
The goals of Experiment 1 were two-fold. First, we examined the effects of material difficulty
and face recognition ability on the confidence-accuracy relationship. Second, we explored other
individual difference factors. We will first discuss the results from our primary analyses followed
by the results from our exploratory analyses.
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3.3.1 Discussion of Primary Analyses
Overall, we expected to see a positive confidence-accuracy relationship across all
material sets, but this relationship would be moderated by both material difficulty and individual
differences in face recognition ability (Hypothesis 1). Consistent with our Hypothesis 1, we
generally saw a positive confidence-accuracy relationship in our aggregate CAC plot and most of
the twelve CAC plots of the 12 material sets; the confidence-accuracy relationship was
moderated to an extent by material difficulty (material effects) and individual differences in face
recognition ability. For instance, the 12 material sets produced differences in the strength of the
confidence-accuracy relationship. Some material sets showed steeper CAC curves than others,
and some materials produced significantly higher accuracy than others. This pattern remained
even after we grouped our 12 material sets into two d′ conditions (high and low); a similar
pattern can also be observed in the CAC plot of the three CFMT groups (e.g., Low vs. High
CFMT). Thus, both material difficulty and face recognition ability can affect the confidenceaccuracy relationship.
Following up on Hypothesis 1, we expected the effects of material difficulty and/or face
recognition ability to produce differences in suspect-ID accuracy even for “high confidence”
identifications (Hypothesis 2). Our Hypothesis 2 was only partially supported. When we limited
our comparison to accuracy levels associated with high-confidence identifications (confidence
rating of 90-100), differences in accuracy between high and low d′ conditions (i.e., material
difficulty) remained but differences in accuracy for the CFMT groups (i.e., face recognition
ability) disappeared. Our material difficulty finding is consistent with a few recently published
studies (Giacona et al., 2021; Lockamyeir et al., 2020; Pezdek et al., 2020). For instance,
estimator variables, such as viewing distance (Lockamyeir, Carlson, Jones, Carlson, &
Weatherford, 2020) and being under influence of marijuana (Pezdek, Abed, & Reisberg, 2020),
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can negatively affect identification accuracy even at high confidence levels. Therefore, highconfidence identifications may not always be associated with suspect-ID accuracy above 90% as
typically reported in prior CAC studies (Wixted & Wells, 2017).
Our face recognition ability finding seems to contradict those reported by Grabman et al.
(2019) and Gettleman et al. (2020), but it is important to recognize the differences in analytic
methods. Those two studies used a mixed effect model approach to analyze their data, whereas
the present study used the bootstrap procedure approach. The mixed model approach has a
limitation in that it cannot estimate the false alarm rate by dividing the number of target-absent
filler IDs by the lineup size (if there is no designated innocent suspect), whereas the bootstrap
procedure does not have this issue (we discussed this issue in our General Discussion section).
Our finding does not suggest that face recognition ability does not affect identification at all. Our
mixed model in one of our exploratory analyses did show CFMT performance was predictive of
identification accuracy. However, for the present study, the effects of face recognition ability on
accuracy disappeared for high-confidence identifications.
The primary focus of any CAC analysis is the suspect-ID accuracy level associated with
high-confidence identifications. For a 100-point scale, the 90-100 confidence bin is often
designated as the “high confidence” category, but we questioned whether similar accuracy levels
can be achieved with more liberal confidence thresholds. More specifically, we hypothesized that
similar overall performance when the high confidence threshold is extended to 80-100 from 90100; however, we expected variations in suspect-ID accuracy when material difficulty is high or
when face recognition ability is very poor (Hypothesis 3). In support of Hypothesis 3, we found
that the 90-100 threshold could be extended to an 80-100 confidence threshold without a large
decrease in suspect-ID accuracy. Overall, accuracy is generally worse when the material (or
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situational factors) is difficult than when it is easy. For easy materials, the 90-100 threshold
could be extended to an 80-100 threshold without a significant decrease in suspect-ID accuracy
for individuals with average to good face recognition ability; poor face recognizers did become
slightly less accurate than the good face recognizers, but this difference was small. For difficult
materials, the 90-100 threshold could be extended to 80-100 without producing any differences
in accuracy across face recognizer groups. Thus, an 80-100 confidence threshold can produce
suspect-ID accuracy levels similar to that of a 90-100 confidence threshold.
Our findings suggest that is important to carefully examine the range of accuracy values
associated with any designated “high confidence” categories. For example, although both 80100% and 90-100% confidence thresholds show similar suspect-ID accuracy levels, the more
conservative threshold discounts identifications that are otherwise accurate but do not meet the
90% confidence threshold. Similarly, in Tekin et al. (2018), the inclusion of identifications made
with confidence ratings of both 3 and 4 from a 4-point scale still yielded an accuracy level
comparable to that of identifications made with a confidence rating of 2 from a 2-point scale. If a
simple conservative-threshold rule had been applied to their 4-point scale, then accurate
identifications with a confidence rating of 3 would not have been considered as “high
confidence” identifications. In other words, rather than simply assigning the most conservative
threshold in any confidence scale as the “high confidence” category, it is also important to
consider whether such threshold is optimal.
In addition to examining suspect-ID accuracy levels using the CAC approach, we were
also interested in the effects of material difficulty and face recognition ability on the underlying
confidence-accuracy function (i.e., the degree in which it deviates from perfect calibration). To
assess the precise correspondence between confidence and accuracy (i.e., calibration) across
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different conditions, we computed calibration C indices using the calibration approach. We
hypothesized that the difficulty level of material will affect the calibration performance (i.e.,
deviation from perfect calibration). That is, the more difficult a lineup scenario, the poorer
calibration should be on it (Hypothesis 4). Consistent with Hypothesis 4, we found a negative
correlation between each material’s d′ value and its calibration C index. In other words, people
were better calibrated for easy than difficult materials, which suggests that people may not adjust
their level of confidence adequately across all situations. However, further analysis revealed that
calibration performance was moderated by both material difficulty and face recognition ability.
Although individuals were more calibrated when the material was easy than when it was
difficult, those with good face recognition ability were generally more calibrated than those with
poor face recognition ability. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is partially supported.
The last set of our primary analyses was intended to address Sauer et al. (2019)’s
concerns about different analytic approaches for analyzing the confidence-accuracy relationship.
We compared the confidence-accuracy relationship across the three approaches as suggested by
Sauer et al. (2019): calibration, CAC, and worst-case-scenario approaches. We expected CAC to
show a higher confidence-accuracy curve than the other two approaches (Hypothesis 5). Because
we did not use designated innocent suspects in any of our materials, the CAC estimated false ID
rate (target-absent filler IDs divided by lineup size) should be smaller than in the other two
approaches, and hence, accuracy should be overall higher in the CAC curve. Consistent with
Hypothesis 5, we found that the CAC approach produced a confidence-accuracy curve that was
generally higher in accuracy than the other two approaches. Despite the significant differences in
accuracy between the CAC and the worst-case-scenario approaches, the worst-case-scenario
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approach still showed much higher accuracy than the calibration approach, suggesting the highly
predictive nature of confidence.
Of course, it can be argued that our designated innocent suspects in the worst-casescenario approach may not be reflective of the innocent suspects in real-world cases. The present
study determined these innocent suspects via post hoc selections, whereas other studies chose
their designated innocent suspect with more elaborate piloting testing methods (e.g., Gronlund et
al., 2009). Even with our worst-case scenario approach, it did not produce an accuracy level for
high-confidence (90-100) identifications that drop below 70% like those reported in the Sauer et
al. (2019)’s reanalysis of the Gronlund et al. (2009) data. Because the twelve sets of eyewitness
stimuli used in the present study do not include those from Gronlund et al (2009), it is unclear
whether there are some specific characteristics about their designated innocent suspect (not
found in our post hoc innocent suspects) that inflate the false ID rate. Nevertheless, the worstcase scenario approach did not produce the worst confidence-accuracy relationship out of the
three approaches.

3.3.2 Discussion of Exploratory Analyses
Now we will turn to our exploratory results. We will first discuss our findings on the
eyewitness metamemory scale (EMS). The EMS has been suggested as a potential self-report
tool for providing insights into one’s face recognition ability and memory functioning (Saraiva et
al., 2019). Because prior studies have shown that people only have a modest level of insight into
their face abilities (Matsuyoshi & Watanabe, 2021; Palermo et al., 2017), we expected the
eyewitness metamemory scale (EMS) to be of low utility in differentiating good from poor
witnesses (Hypothesis 6). Like Saraiva et al. (2020), we examined the confidence-accuracy
relationship for the three EMS factors separately: Memory Contentment, Memory
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Discontentment, and Memory Strategies. However, unlike our study, Saraiva and colleagues
(2020) analyzed their data using the calibration approach and they found that low scorers on
three factors tended to be more calibrated than high scorers. Here, we examined our EMS data
using the CAC approach because it is more relevant for the applied settings. Despite creating two
comparison groups based on 33rd and 66th percentiles (low vs. high scorers, respectively), both
the Memory Contentment and Memory Strategies factors were not particularly effective in
distinguishing good from poor witnesses beyond using a high-confidence criterion alone. The
one exception was the Memory Discontentment factor. There was a 6.1% difference in suspectID accuracy in the 90-100 confidence bin between high and low scorers; individuals who selfreported a negative self-perception about their memory abilities are indeed less accurate
witnesses, suggesting that people have some insight into their memory abilities. Thus,
Hypothesis 6 is partially supported.
In addition to the EMS, we wanted to know whether face-perception (face matching)
ability, like recognition/face memory ability, is predictive of eyewitness identification
performance. Because face recognition and face perception involve related but dissociable
mechanisms, we expected face matching performance, like face recognition performance, to be
predictive of eyewitness identification performance (Hypothesis 7). However, we expected word
recognition (DRM lineups) performance to be unpredictive of eyewitness identification
performance because prior literature has suggested that face recognition is unrelated to word
recognition (Hypothesis 8). In support of Hypothesis 7, we found that GFMT, a face-matching
task, was not only correlated with CFMT but was also predictive of chooser accuracy. Because
the quality of our model was improved when the GFMT was included than when it was not, it
suggests that face-matching ability’s unique contribution to identification accuracy. There was
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no main effect of DRM lineup performance; however, we were surprised to find an interaction
between GFMT and DRM lineup performance (partial support for Hypothesis 8). It appeared that
individuals who did well on the DRM lineup were no more accurate on the eyewitness lineup
task if they had a poor face-matching performance. Those who did well on both tasks were more
accurate on the eyewitness identification task. We have no theoretical explanation as to why
DRM lineup performance interacted with GFMT performance.
The last set of my exploratory analyses was intended to ask a general question about
metacognition—are people’s ability to judge their own performance (i.e., calibration) consistent
across different tasks? Said differently, do some people consistently under- or overestimate their
task performance in different domains? We expected people to show a small but general
consistency in how they scale their confidence judgments across tasks (e.g., over- or
underconfident), but related tasks may be more correlated in calibration than unrelated tasks
(Hypothesis 9). Hypothesis 9 is partially supported. Despite showing weak association in
accuracy across tasks of the same and different domains, there were small to moderate
correlations in bias indices between related and unrelated tasks, which hints at a general
tendency to be over- or underconfident. For example, related tasks (e.g., calibration between two
face tasks) were not necessarily more correlated in calibration (in terms of bias indices) than
distinct tasks (e.g., calibration between a word task and a face task). In line with prior studies
(Bornstein & Zickafoose, 1999; Dentakos et al., 2019; Jackson & Kleitman, 2014), our results
also seem to show that people’s ability to calibrate may be domain-general.
In summary, Experiment 1 revealed a few caveats about the eyewitness confidenceaccuracy relationship. Although a positive confidence-accuracy relationship is observed across
many conditions, people are generally better judges of their identification performance for
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conditions with easy than difficult situational factors. High confidence is associated with high
accuracy, but the level of high accuracy is not always consistent. Comparable accuracy levels
can be achieved with a more liberal high-confidence threshold (80-100 vs. 90-100). Overall,
eyewitness confidence is a predictive index of identification accuracy, but other variables, such
as material difficulty, one’s face abilities (face recognition and face perception), and potentially
one’s general metacognitive ability, can influence the strength of the confidence-accuracy
relationship.
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Chapter 4: Experiment 2
Experiment 2 compared the effectiveness of simultaneous versus sequential lineups across
varying levels of material difficulty and face recognition ability. The effectiveness of these two
lineup procedure formats is a commonly debated topic in the eyewitness literature, with some
favoring simultaneous lineups, some favoring sequential lineups, and others suggesting that both
procedures are similarly effective (e.g., Horry, Fitzgerald, & Mansour, 2020; Mickes, Flowe, &
Wixted, 2012; N. K. Steblay, Dysart, & Wells, 2011). Unlike simultaneous lineups, there are
more variables to consider when administering a sequential lineup: 1) whether or not to disclose
to eyewitnesses the number of images will be presented (backloading instructions), 2) if a lineup
identification ends as soon as witnesses pick a person (the first-yes-counts/termination rule) or,
3) whether or not witnesses are allowed to see any a second lap of the lineup, and so on. Studies
have shown that decisions in these variables can affect the effectiveness of sequential lineups
(Carlson, Carlson, Weatherford, Tucker, & Bednarz, 2016; Meisters, Diedenhofen, & Musch,
2018). Given that one could have different combinations of these variables, there are many
variants of sequential lineups.
Of course, the goal of Experiment 2 was not to compare simultaneous lineups against
every configuration of sequential lineups; rather, we wanted a version of the sequential lineup
procedure that has been shown to perform similarly to that of simultaneous lineups. By having
two lineup procedures with comparable effectiveness, we can better assess the effects of material
difficulty and individual differences in face recognition ability. For this reason, we modeled
Experiment 2’s sequential lineup procedure after that of Horry et al. (2020). Horry and
colleagues examined how the first-yes-counts instructions in the sequential lineup procedure
negatively affect identification performance. They highlighted that how the first-yes-counts
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instructions were not a part of the original sequential lineup protocol, and it is unlikely to be
implemented in applied settings despite its prevalence in laboratory studies.
In their study, Horry and colleagues compared their simultaneous lineup condition to a
sequential lineup condition with the first-yes-counts instructions, and a sequential-control lineup
condition (without the first-yes-count instructions). The difference between the two sequential
lineup conditions was that participants in the first-yes-counts condition were told that: “If you
respond ‘yes’ to a photo, you will not be able to change that decision, and you will not be able to
respond ‘yes’ to any later photos.” Despite the first-yes-counts instructions, participants in both
sequential lineup conditions were able to say “Yes” to multiple lineup members, and if they did,
they had the opportunity to see a second lap of the lineup and make a final decision. In the
sequential lineup condition with the first-yes-count instruction, only the first identification
decision was considered. In the sequential-control lineup condition, only the final identification
decision was considered. For simplicity’s sake, we will refer to these two sequential lineup
conditions as Sequential – First Yes and Sequential – Final Decision lineup conditions,
respectively. Simultaneous and Sequential – Final Decision lineup conditions yielded
comparable performance, but the Sequential – First Yes lineup condition underperformed
compared to the Simultaneous lineup condition1.
In Experiment 2, we adopted Horry et al. (2020)’s sequential-control lineup (i.e.,
Sequential – Final Decision) procedure. Likewise, we allowed participants to see a second lap if
they had said “Yes” to more than one lineup member and then make a final decision. For our
analyses, we compared simultaneous and sequential lineups in the following manner:
Simultaneous versus Sequential – First Yes lineups and Simultaneous versus Sequential – Final
1

This comparison was only statistically significant when the observed false IDs of the designated innocent suspect
were used, but it did not reach significance when the false IDs were estimated with the number of target-absent
fillers divided by the lineup size (Horry et al., 2020).
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Decision lineups. Although we did not use the first-yes-counts instructions or enforce a
termination rule, we were interested in the sequential lineup performance based on participants’
first ‘yes’ responses. The final-decision sequential lineup condition was simply based on the
participants’ only response (if they did not have a second lap of the lineup) or their final decision
(if they had a second lap).
We used two analytic methods to compare these two lineup procedures. First, following
the recommendations of Mickes (2015), we used Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
analyses to measure the lineup discriminability of these lineup procedures (a system variable).
Second, given that we were also interested in the effects of material difficulty and individual
differences (estimator variables) in face recognition ability on these lineup procedures, we also
conducted CAC analyses to examine the confidence-accuracy relationship curves for these
lineup procedures. Our hypotheses are as follow:
Hypothesis 1: We expected that Simultaneous and Sequential – Final Decision lineup
conditions to have similar lineup discriminability. If there are any differences in discriminability,
these differences should be between the Simultaneous and Sequential – First Yes lineup
conditions.
Hypothesis 2: Regardless of material difficulty and/or face recognition ability, we
expected to see similar CAC curves for both Simultaneous and Sequential – Final Decision
lineup conditions. That is, we expected to see similar effects of material difficulty and/or face
recognition ability on the confidence-accuracy relationship, but these effects should appear in
both lineup procedures. Again, if there are any differences, these differences should be between
the Simultaneous and Sequential – First Yes lineup conditions.
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4.1 Method
4.1.1 Participants
759 participants were recruited from the Prolific platform. We excluded 27 participants
who experienced various technical issues (e.g., multiple videos not playing, internet browser
glitches, etc.), who did not complete the entire experiment, or who failed attention checks (see
the Procedure section for details about the specific attention checks). The remaining 737
participants (373 females, 353 males, and 11 other/not reported) provided a total of 8,844
observations (12 lineup trials per participant, half target-present and half target-absent).
Participants’ age ranged from 18 to 77 (M = 34.5, SD = 11.9). Again, we excluded lineup trials in
which these participants had indicated that a specific video did not play, or they had previously
seen the video in another study. After excluding those trials, we had a total of 8,749 observations
remaining (4,344 observations in the simultaneous lineup condition and 4,405 observations in the
sequential lineup condition). A priori, we also planned to exclude any lineup identifications
made in less than 200ms, but none of the identification responses were made that quickly.
Participants received $5.00 for their participation.

4.1.2 Design and Materials
Experiment 2 consisted of three tasks: the eyewitness task, the CFMT, and a
demographic questionnaire (age, sex, education, and ethnicity). The stimuli for these tasks were
the same as those in Experiment 1. Like Experiment 1, participants in Experiment 2 also saw all
12 sets of eyewitness materials, and these materials were presented in random order. The lineup
type (target-present or target-absent) was again manipulated within-subjects. Half of the 12
lineups were target-present, and half were target-absent. Similarly, the CFMT and the
demographic questionnaire were the same as those used in Experiment 1. However, unlike those
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in Experiment 1, participants in Experiment 2 made eyewitness identifications using one of two
lineup procedures (simultaneous lineups or sequential lineups). This lineup procedure variable
was manipulated between-subjects. In other words, participants either saw all 12 sets of materials
in a simultaneous lineup format or a sequential lineup format.
For the simultaneous and sequential lineup conditions, we adapted our task instructions
from Horry et al. (2020), which Horry and colleagues had taken from Norwood Police
Department, MA (http://www.norwoodma.gov/departments/ police/mptc_training_material.php,
accessed June 10, 2021). Unlike Horry et al.’s single-trial study, our experiment consisted of
multiple mock-crime videos and lineup trials. Therefore, we had to make a few wording changes
to fit the procedures of Experiment 2. The exact wording and details of these instructions are
provided below in the procedures section. Lastly, in contrast to Horry et al. who limited their
suspect to positions 2 and 5 in their sequential lineup, our experiment randomized the suspect
position between positions 2 to 6 for both simultaneous and sequential lineups.

4.1.3 Procedure
As in Experiment 1, all participants were tested online. Following the same process,
participants were provided with instructions about the upcoming eyewitness identification task.
In both lineup conditions, participants saw the following instructions: “In the upcoming task, you
will watch a series of mock crime videos. Following each video, you will be asked to identify the
perpetrator of the crime from a photo lineup.” However, the next section of the instructions
differed depending on the randomly assigned lineup condition. In the simultaneous lineup
condition, participants were told that: “You will be viewing all photographs at the same time.
Please look at all photographs carefully and take time before making a decision.” In the
sequential lineup condition, participants were told that “You will be viewing all photographs one
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at a time and in random order. Please look at all of them. I am required to show you the entire
series. Please make a decision about each photograph before moving onto the next one.” The
last section of the instructions was the same for both lineup conditions. Participants were told
“Following your decision, you will be asked to rate your confidence. The perpetrator you saw
may or may not be in the set of photographs. You should remember that it is just as important to
clear innocent persons from suspicion as to identify the guilty.”
Following these instructions, participants were given two attention check trials. For each
trial, participants first saw a smiley and then were asked to identify that smiley from a lineup.
Depending on the randomly assigned condition, the lineup will either be a simultaneous or
sequential lineup format. One of the attention check trials involved a target-present lineup and
the other was a target-absent lineup. If participants failed to answer both attention check trials,
the experiment automatically terminated. After these attention check trials, participants were
shown the first set of eyewitness stimuli. Like Experiment 1, they first watched the video, and
then they were asked three questions: 1) Did you have any issues with the video?, 2) Have you
seen this video before?, and an attention check question specific to the video (e.g., What did the
suspect steal? What was the victim doing before the crime occurred? What color sweater was the
perpetrator wearing?). As in Experiment 1, we did not exclude any data if participants answer the
attention check incorrectly, but if they had answered four of these twelve video attention check
questions incorrectly, the experiment program automatically terminated. Following these
questions, participants were asked to identify the suspect from a lineup.
For the simultaneous lineup condition, participants saw all six lineup members presented
simultaneously in a 3 x 2 array. Above this photo array, the participants were asked “Is the
culprit included in any of the images shown?” The “Not Present” option was located right below
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the photo array. If participants selected a lineup member, they were asked “How confident are
you in your decision?” If participants had selected the “Not Present” option, they were asked,
“How confident are you that none of the people in the lineup were the culprit?” In both cases, a
100-point confidence scale (0 = not confident at all; 100 = completely confident) was presented
right under this question. This process was repeated for all twelve sets of materials.
For the sequential lineup condition, participants saw the six lineup members one at a
time. Below each lineup photo, participants saw the question “Is this the culprit?”, and two
options under this question (Yes or No). Whenever participants chose the “Yes” option, they
were asked “How confident are you in your decision?” with a 100-point confidence scale (0 =
not confident at all; 100 = completely confident) right below this question. If they chose “No”,
they moved onto the next lineup member. If participants had selected “No” for all six lineup
members, then they were asked, “How confident are you that none of the people in the lineup
were the culprit?” If they had said “Yes” to more than one lineup member, they were asked “You
are about to see all of the images again, in the same order. You are being asked to view the
lineup again because you said ‘yes’ to two or more different images the first time. This time, the
lineup will end after your first ‘yes’ response, so please make sure you only say ‘yes’ to the face
you wish to identify. Of course, you should still bear in mind that the culprit may or may not be
present, so you should not feel like you must make an identification.” After seeing these
instructions, participants had to click a “Next” button to proceed to this second lap of the
sequential lineup. As stated in the instructions, this second lap followed the “first yes” rule. If
participants changed their minds and believed that the lineup did not contain the culprit, they
could select “No” for all six lineup members and provide their confidence rating for such
decisions. If participants had only said “Yes” to one lineup member during the first lap, they
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would simply move onto the next set of eyewitness stimuli without receiving a second lap of the
sequential lineup. This process was repeated for all twelve sets of materials.
Following the eyewitness identification task, participants were asked to complete the
Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT). Again, participants were told to respond with
keypresses (1, 2, or 3). Three attention-check trials were added (i.e., a prompt about which key to
press) to the 72 CFMT trials (a total of 75 trials in this section). If participants failed to answer
more than one of these attention-check trials incorrectly, the experiment automatically
terminated. After the CFMT, they were asked a series of demographic questions (age, sex,
education, and ethnicity). Lastly, they were debriefed and compensated for their participation.

4.2 Results
4.2.1 CFMT Performance and Identification Responses
Before turning to our main analyses, we first examined whether there were significant
differences in face recognition ability between individuals who were randomly assigned to the
simultaneous (M = 54.62, SD = 10.17) or sequential lineup condition (M = 54.67, SD = 10.07).
Figure 23 shows the distribution of CFMT scores from both the simultaneous and sequential
lineup conditions. Our t-test indicated that these two groups did not significantly differ in terms
of face recognition ability, t(735) = -.07, p = .94.
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Figure 23. The distribution of CFMT scores from both the simultaneous and sequential lineup
conditions. The lines represent the mean CFMT score in each condition.
Table 4 shows the proportions of different identification responses for all 12 materials.
As in Experiment 1, the eyewitness stimuli vary widely in difficulty. Table 5 shows the d′ values
for each set of materials by the lineup procedure format and ordered the materials by the d′
values from smallest to largest. Although the exact ordering of material sets differed across
lineup procedures, the five material sets that yielded a d′ value of 1.5 value or lower were the
same five material sets in Experiment 1. Likewise, this is true for the remaining seven material
sets. As in Experiment 1, we used this same criterion to create low and high d′ conditions for our
analyses in the later sections.
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Table 4
The proportions of identification responses in Experiment 2 as a function of lineup procedure conditions.
Simultaneous
Sequential (First Yes)
Sequential (Final Decision)
Not
Not
Not
Material
Type Suspect Filler
N
Suspect Filler
N
Suspect Filler
N
Present
Present
Present
0.72 0.09
0.20
169
TP
0.61
0.26
0.14
190
0.67
0.19
0.14
190
BL-David
0.41
0.59
192
TA
0.48
0.52
179
0.47
0.53
179
0.90 0.04
0.06
189
TP
0.71
0.20
0.09
187
0.86
0.05
0.09
187
BL-Thomas
0.37
0.63
172
TA
0.41
0.59
181
0.41
0.59
181
0.62 0.03
0.35
185
TP
0.60
0.06
0.34
167
0.62
0.05
0.34
167
Brewer
0.18
0.82
179
TA
0.16
0.84
201
0.16
0.84
201
0.40 0.29
0.31
178
TP
0.29
0.50
0.20
187
0.35
0.42
0.22
187
Clark
0.64
0.36
184
TA
0.66
0.34
174
0.64
0.36
174
0.51 0.30
0.19
202
TP
0.27
0.57
0.17
169
0.41
0.42
0.17
169
Horry-Drug
0.64
0.36
159
TA
0.60
0.40
197
0.59
0.41
197
0.83 0.13
0.04
174
TP
0.59
0.35
0.06
194
0.81
0.11
0.07
194
Horry-Shoplift
0.50
0.50
186
TA
0.48
0.52
170
0.47
0.53
170
0.30 0.19
0.51
172
TP
0.33
0.21
0.46
194
0.37
0.16
0.47
194
Mickes-Hispanic
0.33
0.67
192
TA
0.23
0.77
175
0.23
0.77
175
0.28 0.31
0.42
177
TP
0.20
0.35
0.45
166
0.20
0.36
0.45
166
Mickes-Laptop
0.50
0.50
187
TA
0.50
0.50
204
0.49
0.51
204
0.46 0.35
0.20
193
TP
0.28
0.49
0.22
201
0.38
0.39
0.22
201
Mickes-Purse
0.62
0.38
172
TA
0.56
0.44
170
0.55
0.45
170
0.92 0.08
0.01
169
TP
0.62
0.36
0.02
185
0.86
0.11
0.03
185
Mickes-White-F
0.61
0.39
193
TA
0.55
0.45
180
0.54
0.46
180
0.74 0.11
0.14
160
TP
0.62
0.24
0.14
194
0.70
0.15
0.15
194
Mickes-White-M
0.39
0.61
202
TA
0.37
0.63
175
0.37
0.63
175
0.66 0.18
0.16
199
TP
0.47
0.30
0.24
169
0.53
0.21
0.25
169
Wixted
0.45
0.55
159
TA
0.43
0.57
196
0.43
0.57
196
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Table 5
A list of material sets ordered from smallest to largest d' prime values. Numbers inside the parentheses
are d' values. The horizontal line separates the easy and difficult materials.
Experiment 1

Experiment 2

Simultaneous
Mickes-Laptop (0.77)
Mickes-Purse (0.88)
Mickes-Hispanic (1.14)
Clark (1.2)
Horry-Drug (1.39)
Wixted (1.6)
Brewer (1.89)
BL-David (1.95)
Mickes-White-M (2.15)
Horry-Shoplift (2.24)
Mickes-White-F (2.58)
BL-Thomas (2.6)

Sequential (Final
Simultaneous
Sequential (First Yes)
Decision)
Mickes-Laptop (0.79)
Mickes-Laptop (0.56) Mickes-Laptop (0.55)
Clark (1)
Horry-Drug (0.66)
Clark (0.86)
Mickes-Hispanic (1.06)
Clark (0.69)
Mickes-Purse (1.03)
Mickes-Purse (1.15)
Mickes-Purse (0.74)
Horry-Drug (1.07)
Horry-Drug (1.27)
Mickes-Hispanic (1.32) Mickes-Hispanic (1.42)
Wixted (1.87)
Wixted (1.38)
Wixted (1.54)
BL-David (2.06)
Horry-Shoplift (1.62)
BL-David (1.85)
Mickes-White-M (2.17) Mickes-White-F (1.63) Mickes-White-M (2.06)
Brewer (2.19)
BL-David (1.67)
Brewer (2.23)
Horry-Shoplift (2.35) Mickes-White-M (1.85) Horry-Shoplift (2.31)
Mickes-White-F (2.66)
BL-Thomas (2.05)
Mickes-White-F (2.44)
BL-Thomas (2.86)
Brewer (2.2)
BL-Thomas (2.55)

Note. The first five material sets were the same across both Experiments 1 and 2. Likewise, this
was the case for the remaining seven material sets. Although the d' values for each material set
were not consistent across experiments and lineup procedures, its relative difficulty level based
on our material difficulty categories remained the same (i.e., easy vs. difficult materials).

4.2.2 The Effectiveness of Lineup Procedures
We examined the effectiveness of the two lineup procedures (simultaneous vs. sequential
lineups) in three different contexts: the aggregate of the 12 material sets, by each material set,
and by CFMT groups. Because participants in the sequential lineup condition were given a
second lap if they had said “Yes” to two or more lineup members, we created two sequential
lineup datasets, one based on their first “Yes”, and one on based on their final decision.
Henceforth, we will refer to these two datasets as Sequential – First Yes, and Sequential – Final
Decision, respectively. The Sequential – First Yes dataset consisted of first-yes identification
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responses regardless of whether participants had said “Yes” more than once and had proceeded
to a second lap of the lineup; only their first “Yes” responses were included in this dataset. The
Sequential – Final Decision dataset consisted of either participants’ only identification response
(if there was no second lap) or their final identification decisions (if there was a second lap). This
allowed us to compare 1) whether simultaneous lineups are more effective than sequential
lineups using the first-yes rule, and 2) whether simultaneous lineups are more effective than
sequential lineups using a final-decision rule. To perform these comparisons, we conducted a
series of ROC analyses.
ROC Analyses. For our ROC analyses, we followed the procedures described in the
supplementary materials of Gronlund, Wixted, and Mickes (2014). We conducted our ROC
analyses using the pROC statistical package for R (Robin et al., 2011). ROC curves for
Simultaneous, Sequential- First Yes, and Sequential-Final Decision lineups. These ROC curves
were based on the hit and estimated false alarm rates from five confidence bins (0-29, 30-49, 5069, 70-89, and 90-100). Because our experiment did not involve a designated innocent suspect
procedure, the false alarm rate was estimated by dividing the number of target-absent fillers by
the lineup size (6). Like Horry et al. (2020), we calculated the pAUC based on the false alarm
regions shared by all three curves to prevent extrapolating beyond any of the curves’ observed
data. For each comparison between two ROC curves, we set the pROC bootstrap parameter to
10,000 replicates. For each set of analyses, we compared the following ROC curves:
Simultaneous vs. Sequential-First Yes and Simultaneous vs. Sequential-Final Decision.

4.2.3 The Effects of Material Difficulty and Lineup Procedures
We first constructed lineup procedure ROC curves of the aggregate (across 12 material sets).
Figure 24 shows the lineup procedure ROC curves for the aggregate of all 12 material sets. The
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area under the curve was greater for the Simultaneous lineup condition followed by the
Sequential-Final Decision curve and then the Sequential - First Yes conditions. Our ROC
analysis revealed that Simultaneous lineups significantly outperformed Sequential-First Yes
lineups, D = 3.918, p < .001. That is, when the first-yes rule was implemented in sequential
lineups, sequential lineups significantly underperformed compared to simultaneous lineups.

Figure 24. A ROC plot of the aggregate of 12 materials. The three ROC curves represent the
three lineup procedures.
We then examined the lineup procedure ROC curves for each material set. Figure 25
shows the lineup procedure ROC curves in each of the 12 material sets. In 11 out of the 12
material sets, the ROC curves for Simultaneous lineups were above those of Sequential – First
Yes and Sequential- Final Decision lineups; the only exception was the Brewer material set. In
some cases, the ROC curves for Sequential – Final Decision were similar to those of
Simultaneous lineups (e.g., Horry-Shoplift, Mickes-White-F). In other cases, the Sequential –
First Decision ROC curves were like those of Sequential – First Yes (e.g., Mickes-Laptop,
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Brewer), or fell between Simultaneous and Sequential- First Yes (e.g., BL-Thomas, Clark). For
each material set, we compared the following ROC curves: Simultaneous vs. Sequential-First
Yes and Simultaneous vs. Sequential-Final Decision. Although Simultaneous and SequentialFirst Yes lineups were not significantly different in 11 of the 12 material sets, Simultaneous
lineups were better than Sequential-First Yes lineups for the Mickes-White-F material set, D =
3.1025, p = 0.002. Across all twelve materials, the difference between Simultaneous and
Sequential-Final Decision lineups did not reach significance, p > .05. However, visual inspection
of all material set ROC curves suggests a slight advantage of simultaneous lineups.
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Figure 25. (continued)
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Figure 25. Twelve ROC plots for the twelve material sets. Each plot shows the ROC curves for
the three lineup procedures.
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4.2.4 Face Recognition and Lineup Procedures
Next, we turn to the lineup procedure ROC curves across the three CFMT groups: Low CFMT
(scores < 45), Medium CFMT (scores 45-64), and High CFMT (scores > 64). As in Experiment
1, Low and High CFMT groups consisted of identification responses from individuals who
scored 1 SD below or above the mean CFMT score, respectively. We compared lineup procedure
ROC curves within each CFMT group (see Figure 26). Simultaneous lineups outperformed
Sequential-First Yes lineups in both the Low CFMT group, D = 2.68, p = .007, and the Medium
CFMT group, D = 2.97, p =.003, but not for the High CFMT group. In other words, the
Sequential – First Yes lineup procedure may be problematic for individuals with poor to average
face recognition ability but not for individuals with great face recognition ability. Our ROC
analysis suggested that Simultaneous lineups were no different from Sequential-Final Decision
lineups in all three CFMT groups, p >.05. However, it is worth noting that the area under each
simultaneous lineup ROC curve was consistently greater than that of both sequential lineup
procedures. This was true for all three CFMT groups, suggesting an advantage for simultaneous
lineups across individuals with varying levels of face recognition ability.
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Figure 26. (continued)

Figure 26. The three ROC plots show the ROC curves across three CFMT groups.

4.2.5 Lineup Procedures and The Confidence-Accuracy Relationship (CAC
Approach)
As in Experiment 1, we also examined the confidence-accuracy relationship using the CAC
approach. We constructed CAC plots for the aggregate, by each material set, and by CFMT
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groups. The bootstrap procedures for computing bootstrap CIs are the same as those in
Experiment (see our explanation in the Experiment 1 Results section). The number of
identification responses for each plot can be found in Appendix G.
Aggregate. Figure 27 shows the aggregate CAC curves for the three lineup procedures
(Simultaneous, Sequential – First Yes, and Sequential – Final Decision). In the third confidence
bin (50-69), accuracy was higher for the Simultaneous lineup condition than the Sequential –
First Yes lineup condition (87.3% vs. 82.0%, 5.3% difference in accuracy, 98.3% CI [0.9%,
9.7%]). However, all three lineup procedures produced similar accuracy levels for all other
confidence bins. In the fifth confidence bin (90-100), the accuracy levels for the Simultaneous,
Sequential – First Yes, and Sequential – Final Decision conditions were 97.4%, 95.5%, and
96.7%, respectively. Thus, high confidence is associated with high accuracy across all three
lineup procedures.
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Figure 27. An aggregate CAC plot of the 12 materials. Three CAC curves represent the three
lineup procedures. The error bars represent 95% BCa bootstrap confidence intervals.
Individual Material Sets. Turning to individual material sets in Figure 28, we can see a
similar pattern overall; however, there were also differences. Of particular interest are the
differences in accuracy of the 90-100% confidence bin. For example, there were five targetabsent filler IDs but no suspect IDs in the Clark 90-100% confidence bin for the Sequential –
First Yes condition, which resulted in an accuracy of zero (this point was not included in the
CAC plot of the Clark material). For Sequential – First Yes condition, the 90-100% confidence
bin for Mickes-Hispanic and Mickes-Laptop materials had an accuracy of 100 with no variability
in confidence intervals because no target-absent filler IDs were made at the 90-100% confidence
range. Moreover, other materials show wide or narrow 95% confidence intervals. Although all
materials had a similar number of trials (see the trial column for each material set in Table 3), the
reliability of the 90-100% confidence range varied. In other words, given a similar number of
opportunities to make an identification, the reliability/predictivity of confidence ratings can still
vary depending on eyewitness material sets.
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Figure 28. (continued)
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Figure 28. Twelve CAC plots for the twelve material sets. The error bars represent 95% BCa
bootstrap confidence intervals.
D′ Conditions. Again, as in Experiment 1, one could argue that these variabilities are
simply due to an inadequate number of observations. To address this argument, we aggregated
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these materials into low and high d′ conditions as we had done in Experiment 1, and then we
constructed CAC plots for these conditions. Table 5 shows d′ values for each material set and
lineup procedure condition, sorted by the smallest to the largest value. As in Experiment 1, we
used a d′ value of 1.5 or below as the criterion for the low d′ condition, and those with a d′ value
greater than 1.5 as the criterion for the high d′ condition. Although the order differed across
lineup conditions, the first five sets of materials with a d′ value less than 1.5 were the same
across all three lineup conditions (and the same five material sets in Experiment 1).

Figure 29. Three lineup procedure CAC plots for high and low d′ conditions. The error bars
represent 95% BCa bootstrap confidence intervals.
Figure 29 shows the CAC plots for these results. For the high d′ condition, all three
lineup procedures produced similar accuracy levels across all confidence bins. However, this was
not the case for the low d′ condition. Individuals in the Simultaneous lineup condition was more
accurate than those in the Sequential – First Yes lineup condition for the 30-49 confidence bin
(83.3% vs. 70.1%, 13.1% difference in accuracy, 98.3% CI [2.8, 23.9] and for the 90-100
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confidence bin (93.3% vs. 73.2%, 20.0% difference in accuracy, 98.3% CI [0.46%, 45.6%]). In
contrast, there was no difference between the Simultaneous and Sequential – Final Decision
lineup conditions across all confidence bins. Thus, all three lineup procedures produced similar
accuracy levels for easy materials, but the Sequential – First Yes lineup condition tended to be
less accurate than the Simultaneous lineup condition for difficult materials.
CFMT Groups. Lastly, for this section, we examined the confidence-accuracy
relationship across lineup procedures by three CFMT groups. Figure 26 shows the CAC plots for
the Low, Medium, and High CFMT groups. Again, Low CFMT and High CFMT groups
consisted of identification responses from individuals who scored 1 SD below or above the mean
CFMT score, respectively. To ensure that stable BCa bootstrap CIs could be estimated, we
organized our data into three confidence bins: 0-50, 51-89, and 90-100. For the High CFMT and
Low CFMT groups, all three lineup procedures produced similar accuracy levels across all
confidence bins. For the Medium CFMT group, there were differences between lineup
procedures in the 50-89 confidence bin. Individuals in the Simultaneous lineup condition were
more accurate than those in the Sequential – First Yes lineup condition (91.3% vs. 86.6%, 4.8 %
difference in accuracy, 98.3% CI [1.1%, 8.6%]) and those in the Sequential – Final Decision
lineup condition (91.3% vs. 88.0%, 3.3% difference in accuracy, 98.3% CI [0.02%, 6.8%]).
However, like the High CFMT and Low CFMT groups, the Medium CFMT group were also
similarly accurate in the 0-50 and 90-100 confidence bins regardless of lineup procedures. In
other words, the confidence-accuracy relationship was largely similar across lineup procedures
for all three CFMT groups.
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Figure 26. Three lineup procedure CAC plots for each CFMT group. The error bars represent
95% BCa bootstrap confidence intervals.

4.3 Discussion
Experiment 2 examined the effects of material difficulty and face recognition ability on 1) the
effectiveness (lineup discriminability) of simultaneous and sequential lineups, and 2) the
confidence-accuracy relationship of these lineup procedures. As stated earlier, our sequential
lineup condition was examined in two ways: the first-yes rule and final decision. The specific
comparisons of interest were Simultaneous vs. Sequential – First Yes and Simultaneous vs.
Sequential – Final Decision. We compared these lineup conditions in three different contexts: the
aggregate of the 12 material sets, by each material set, and by CFMT groups.
To examine lineup discriminability, we conducted a series of ROC analyses for the
aforementioned conditions. We expected that Simultaneous and Sequential – Final Decision
lineup conditions to have similar lineup discriminability. If there are any differences in
discriminability, these differences should be between the Simultaneous and Sequential – First
Yes lineup conditions (Hypothesis 1). Consistent with Hypothesis 1, our ROC analysis of the
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aggregate (all 12 material sets together) indicated that simultaneous lineups significantly
outperformed sequential lineups when the first-yes rule was implemented for sequential lineups.
When we conducted ROC analysis for each material set individually, only one out of twelve
material sets yielded a significant difference between the Simultaneous and Sequential-First Yes
conditions. This occurred in the Mickes-White-F material set. This difference cannot be
attributed to its being difficult because Mickes-White-F was one of the materials with a high hit
rate and a large d′ value in both Experiments 1 and 2. In addition to examining at ROC curves for
each material set, we also compared ROC curves across our three CFMT groups. We found that
the area under the curve was greater for Simultaneous than Sequential-First Yes curves, but this
was limited to individuals with poor to average face recognition ability (Low and Medium
CFMT groups). Although none of our ROC analyses indicated a significant difference between
Simultaneous and Sequential–Final Decision lineup procedures, almost all of our ROC curves
suggested a slight advantage of simultaneous lineups.
In addition to our ROC analyses, we conducted CAC analyses to examine the confidenceaccuracy relationship across lineup procedures. Regardless of material difficulty and/or face
recognition ability, we expected to see similar CAC curves for both Simultaneous and Sequential
– Final Decision lineup procedures. If there are any differences, these differences should be
between the Simultaneous and Sequential – First Yes lineup conditions (Hypothesis 2). Although
our aggregate CAC plot did not reveal any differences between lineup procedures, we observed
instability in accuracy levels in individual material CAC plots even for high-confidence (90100%) identifications. For some material sets, the 95% confidence intervals were quite narrow
and for others, their confidence intervals were quite wide. Even though the number of trials or
the opportunity to make an identification for each material set was similar, we can see some
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material sets produced confidence intervals with a small amount of variability, whereas this was
not the case for other material sets. We aggregated our data into high and low d′ conditions (easy
vs. difficult materials) to increase stability. For easy materials, all three lineup procedures
produced similar accuracy levels across confidence bins. However, for difficult materials, the
Sequential – First Yes lineup condition was less accurate than the Simultaneous lineup condition
at the 90-100 confidence bin, but there was no difference between the Sequential – Final
Decision and Simultaneous lineup conditions at the 90-100 confidence bin. Lastly, we examined
how the three CFMT groups performed across different lineup procedure formats, and we found
that accuracy levels for high-confidence identifications were similar for all three lineup
procedures regardless of face recognition ability. Thus, we also found support for Hypothesis 2.
It is important to emphasize that we did not explicitly tell participants that they could
only respond yes once nor did we enforce the first-yes procedure during the identification
process in the sequential lineup condition. Our sequential lineup condition was akin to Horry et
al.’s sequential control condition where participants were simply told to make a decision for each
lineup member and were allowed a second lap if they had said “Yes” to two or more lineup
members. Our results are consistent with those of Horry et al. (2020)’s simultaneous versus
sequential control condition. However, unlike our Experiment 2, Horry et al. did have an explicit
first-yes sequential lineup condition in which they explicitly told participants that only their first
yes would be counted, and their first-yes sequential lineup condition underperformed due to
conservative criterion shift. Despite not having such a condition, our “soft” first-yes rule
sequential lineups condition was enough to produce poorer discriminability and suspect-ID
accuracy compared to simultaneous lineups in some circumstances. In short, our ROC and CAC
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analyses showed more favorable results for simultaneous lineups and less favorable results for
sequential lineups with the first-yes instructions.
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Chapter 5: General Discussion
The motivation for the present study was to provide a more extensive investigation of the
eyewitness confidence-accuracy relationship. Although an accumulating number of CAC studies
have generally reported a strong eyewitness confidence-accuracy relationship (e.g., Wixted et al.,
2015; Wixted & Wells, 2017), it is important to identify circumstances in which the
correspondence between eyewitness confidence and accuracy deviates from expectation (i.e.,
boundary conditions). For the present study, we considered two types of boundary conditions:
material difficulty (i.e., the difficulty level associated with situational factors of a crime scenario)
and individual differences in face recognition ability. Experiment 1 examined whether these
boundary conditions (material difficulty and/or face recognition ability) significantly impair the
confidence-accuracy relationship (i.e., suspect-ID accuracy and calibration), and Experiment 2
examined whether these boundary conditions equally affect simultaneous and sequential lineup
procedures. Furthermore, our exploratory analyses also revealed a few additional individual
difference factors (e.g., face perception and metacognitive abilities) that may contribute to
eyewitness identification performance. In the following sections, we will discuss our findings
and their theoretical/practical implications. Then, we will reply to the three applied setting
questions we outlined earlier in this dissertation. Lastly, we will discuss the limitations of the
present study.

5.1 The Effects of Material Difficulty on Suspect-ID
Accuracy
Material difficulty (i.e., the difficulty levels of situational factors in a crime scenario) can
negatively affect the confidence-accuracy relationship, even suspect-ID accuracy of highconfidence identifications. We first observed this effect when we examined the individual CAC
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curves of twelve material sets and this effect remained after we aggregated these material sets
into two d′ conditions (easy vs. difficult). Even when only high-confidence (90-100%)
identifications were considered, suspect-ID accuracy was significantly higher for easy than
difficult material sets. Our finding is not an outlier. We replicated the material effect reported in
Tekin et al. (2018). The Wixted and Mickes-Laptop stimuli used in the present study were the
same as Material Sets A and B used in Tekin et al. (2018), respectively. Like our study, Tekin et
al. also observed a difference in suspect-ID accuracy for high-confidence identifications across
two material sets.
In addition, recent studies have also reported lower suspect-ID accuracy levels for highconfidence identifications when estimator variables are less than optimal (Giacona et al., 2021;
Lockamyeir et al., 2020; Pezdek et al., 2020). For instance, Lockamyeir et al. manipulated
viewing distance (i.e., the distance between a witness and a perpetrator) in three levels: 3m, 10m,
and 20m. Their results show that high-confidence identifications in the 20 m condition (below
75% accuracy) were significantly less accurate compared to those in the 3m and 10 m conditions
(above 80% accuracy). Pezdek et al. examined the effects of marijuana on the confidenceaccuracy relationship. Their participants (all marijuana users) were randomly assigned to a
control or marijuana condition. Unsurprisingly, suspect-ID accuracy for high-confidence
identifications was lower in the marijuana than in the control condition (68% accuracy vs. 85%
accuracy, respectively). Because these studies manipulated their estimator variables, their
findings pinpoint the specific boundary conditions of the confidence-accuracy relationship.
Unlike the aforementioned studies, our study did not systematically manipulate estimator
variables as we simply used eyewitness stimuli produced by different eyewitness researchers in
the field. Even though our participants saw the corresponding lineup almost immediately after
116

watching a mock crime video, we still observed these negative effects on the confidenceaccuracy relationship. Furthermore, given our within-subjects design, participants should have
experienced some sense of material difficulty due to the contrast of the twelve sets of materials
that varied in estimator variables (e.g., exposure duration, viewing distance, angle, lighting, etc.).
Ideally, participants should be adjusting their confidence per the difficulty level of the material
set. Perhaps some participants made such adjustments, but at least a sizable proportion of them
did so inadequately, which resulted in differences in the confidence-accuracy relationship
observed in the present study.
We generally observed a positive confidence-accuracy relationship across different
eyewitness material sets, but our material difficulty findings do pose a concern for applied
settings. Unlike laboratory studies where there are multiple “witnesses”, by design, real-life
cases may sometimes involve a single witness. In such cases, it may be difficult to judge the
difficulty level of the combination of estimator variables experienced by a witness. It is not
possible to calculate a d′ value for a situation to use as an index of situational factor difficulty
level. Therefore, it is difficult to judge how a particular situation may affect the reliability of
identification responses expressed with a specific level of confidence (J. D. Sauer et al., 2019).
One possible solution is to rely on a conservative criterion for high-confidence identifications
(e.g., a confidence of 90-100% in a 100-point scale or a confidence rating of 7 in a 7-point scale).
However, the present study has shown that a conservative high-confidence threshold does not
eliminate the difference in suspect-ID accuracy for easy versus difficult materials.
Our different material sets are neither an exhaustive sample of eyewitness materials nor
necessarily a thorough representation of real-world crime cases. In other words, the range of
suspect-ID accuracy values for high-confidence identification observed in the present study may
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not capture the full range of accuracy values. For example, suspect-ID accuracy for highconfidence identifications ranged from 78.9% to 99.0% for our 12 material sets. In other studies,
suspect-ID accuracy has dropped below 70% (Gronlund et al., 2009; Lockamyeir et al., 2020;
Pezdek et al., 2020). Although a majority of the CAC studies generally show that high
confidence is associated with high accuracy (above 90%; Wixted et al., 2015; Wixted & Wells,
2017), exceptions should not be overlooked (J. D. Sauer et al., 2019). Having prior knowledge
about boundary conditions and their effect on the reliability of suspect-ID accuracy will allow
applied settings to make more informed judgments about a witness’s confidence statement. Thus,
future studies should identify other potential boundary conditions.

5.2 The Effects of Face Recognition Ability on Suspect-ID
Accuracy
In contrast to our material difficulty findings, the effects of face recognition ability on the
suspect-ID accuracy were nullified when high-confidence identifications were considered. At
first glance, our findings appear to contradict those reported by Grabman et al. (2019) and
Gettleman et al. (2020), because these two studies suggest that poor face recognizers are more
likely to make high-confidence identification errors than good face recognizers. However, our
results suggest that both good and poor face recognizers are similarly accurate when
identifications were made with high confidence (90-100 confidence ratings). These
inconsistencies could be partially due to differences in analytic methods used in those studies and
our study.
Both Grabman et al. and Gettleman et al. used a mixed-effects modeling approach to
examine the relationship between face recognition ability and the confidence-accuracy
relationship. However, one limitation of the mixed modeling approach is that it is not possible to
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apply the false alarm estimation calculation for situations in which there is no designated
innocent suspect. As mentioned earlier, when there is no designated innocent suspect, the CAC
approach estimates the false alarm rate via dividing the number of target-absent fillers by the
lineup size. This calculation step cannot be done in a mixed model framework. For this reason,
both Grabman et al. and Gettleman et al. had reported their model results in terms of chooser
accuracy (i.e., all target-present and target-absent filler IDs as errors) and a proxy measure of
suspect-ID accuracy (i.e., all target-absent filler IDs as errors). Despite the name, their proxy
measure of suspect-ID accuracy is essentially one variant of the calibration approach in which all
target-present filler IDs are excluded but all target-absent filler IDs are treated as errors. With
either chooser accuracy or their proxy measure of suspect-ID accuracy as the dependent variable,
the error component in their respective calculation will be greater than that of suspect-ID
accuracy. As a result, accuracy levels reported in Grabman et al. and Gettleman et al. were lower
than suspect-ID accuracy levels typically reported in CAC studies (e.g., see Figure 5 for a figure
from Grabman et al.).
Unlike Grabman et al. (2019) and Gettleman et al. (2020), we analyzed our data using the
bootstrap approach because it allowed us to calculate suspect-ID accuracy directly. As stated
earlier, suspect-ID accuracy provides the relevant information required to answer applied-setting
questions (Mickes, 2015; Wixted & Wells, 2017). Since the purpose of the present study was to
address questions relevant to the applied settings, the bootstrap approach was a more suitable
option than the mixed-effect model approach. The bootstrap method (or the jackknife procedure
used in older eyewitness identification studies) has typically been used in eyewitness studies
where participants only provide a single identification response. In these cases, the bootstrap
method’s independence assumption is met because the observations in the original sample are
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independent of one another. However, participants in the present study were shown twelve
different eyewitness material sets, and they provided one response per material set. In other
words, any analyses involving aggregated data (i.e., aggregation across multiple material sets)
would violate the independence assumption. We have proposed a few different bootstrap
approaches to circumvent this issue (see the Experiment 1 Results section), but we ultimately
analyzed our data using the stratified bootstrap approach. For our stratified bootstrap approach,
observations were resampled within each material set separately, and then a separate suspect-ID
accuracy value was computed for each material set. Again, because there was no designated
innocent suspect, we divided the number of target-absent filler IDs by the lineup size. These
accuracy values were aggregated to produce a weighted suspect-ID accuracy value. In short, the
bootstrap approach allowed us to directly calculate suspect-ID accuracy when there was no
designated innocent suspect.
It is important to recognize that both the mixed-effect model approach (Gettleman et al.,
2021; Grabman et al., 2019) and our bootstrap approach have their advantages and
disadvantages. An obvious advantage of our bootstrap approach is that it can directly compute
suspect-ID accuracy when there is no designated innocent suspect, whereas the mixed model
approach cannot. Unlike the mixed-effect model approach, one disadvantage of our bootstrap
approach is that does not necessarily account for within-subject variability. Because the CAC
formula itself does not have a component that handles within-subject variability, our bootstrap
approach also does not account for how the same participant might perform across different
material sets; this disadvantage applied to all the different bootstrap procedures proposed in this
dissertation. Lastly, it is also worth noting that our bootstrap approach examined the effects of
face recognition ability in terms of three discrete groups based on CFMT scores, whereas the
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mixed-effect model approach treated CFMT scores as a continuous variable. It is beyond the
scope of this dissertation to statistically compare and evaluate the bootstrap approach to the
mixed-effect model approach. The purpose of this discussion is to simply highlight how results
may differ depending on the types of statistical procedures employed and that future studies may
consider developing new analytic methods that better accommodate eyewitness experiments with
complex designs.
Although our study shows that both good and poor face recognizers can achieve similar
suspect-ID accuracy levels when they make high-confidence identifications, our study does not
suggest that face recognition ability does not affect identification performance at all. Compared
to poor face recognizers, good face recognizers were generally more accurate across all
confidence bins were adept at scaling their confidence judgments (i.e., more calibrated). Face
recognition tests, like the CFMT, are not difficult to implement in real-world settings and these
tests can potentially be used as a secondary indicator of accuracy. However, even if good and
poor face recognizers show significant differences in suspect-ID accuracy levels, these
differences have to be large enough to justify the assessment of general face recognition ability
in applied settings.

5.3 Simultaneous Versus Sequential Lineups
The simultaneous versus sequential lineup debate has begun decades ago and it continues to be a
topic of research today (e.g., Horry et al., 2020; Mickes et al., 2012; N. K. Steblay et al., 2011).
Recently, Horry and colleagues (2020) show the presence of the first-yes rule instructions in
sequential lineups undermines its effectiveness by inducing more conservative criterion shifts.
Without the first-yes rule instructions, simultaneous and sequential lineups show comparable
performance. Based on these findings, we asked—do boundary conditions in the eyewitness
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confidence-accuracy relationship equally affect both simultaneous and sequential lineups
(without the first-yes instructions)? The short answer is yes.
In terms of lineup discriminability, simultaneous lineups outperformed sequential lineups
if we only considered the first-yes identification responses (i.e., the “first yes” rule). Unlike
Horry et al. (2020), we did not have an explicit first-yes sequential lineup condition in which
participants were explicitly told that only their first yes would be counted. Our “first-yes”
condition was simply based on participants’ first-yes responses rather than their final decision (if
they had said yes to multiple lineup members). Even so, our “soft” first-yes rule sequential
lineup condition was sufficient in producing poorer lineup discriminability compared to that of
the simultaneous lineup condition for individuals with poor to average face recognition ability. In
other words, the first-yes sequential lineups may be unsuitable for witnesses with poor face
recognition ability. Although none of our ROC analyses revealed significant differences between
simultaneous lineups and sequential lineups that allowed for a final decision, visual inspection of
all our ROC curves revealed an advantage in favor of simultaneous lineups.
Our CAC analyses revealed that both material difficulty and face recognition ability
equally affect the confidence-accuracy relationship (more specifically, suspect-ID accuracy)
regardless of lineup procedure formats. For easy materials, simultaneous and sequential lineups
produced similar accuracy levels. For difficult materials, high-confidence identifications from
simultaneous lineups were more accurate than high-confidence first-yes identifications from
sequential lineups. However, differences in face recognition ability did not produce significant
differences in suspect-ID accuracy levels irrespective of lineup procedures. In other words,
witnesses achieved similar suspect-ID accuracy levels regardless of whether they had received a
simultaneous or sequential lineup. Thus, simultaneous and sequential lineups generally do not
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differ in suspect-ID accuracy when only high-confidence identifications are considered except
when the first-yes rule is applied to sequential lineups under suboptimal conditions.
To our knowledge, the present study is the first to compare both lineup procedures while
considering the effects of material difficulty and face recognition ability. Although Andersen et
al. (2014) administered the CFMT in their study comparing simultaneous and sequential lineups
using ROC analysis, CFMT performance was only used as a model term in their logistic
regression models that individually examined guilty suspect IDs from target-present lineups and
false IDs from target-absent lineups. CFMT performance was not used in their ROC analysis.
Although Andersen et al. used two separate sets of eyewitness stimuli (carjacker and pursesnatchers), there was no difference between the two material sets. For this reason, they removed
the material variable from their logistical regression models. In other words, they could not have
examined the effects of material difficulty on lineup procedures. Therefore, findings from the
present study add to the lineup procedure literature.
Overall, the present study shows that boundary conditions can occur in both simultaneous
and sequential lineups, suggesting the type of lineup procedures employed (a system variable)
may not necessarily produce a boundary condition for the confidence-accuracy relationship.
However, it does appear that sequential lineups with the first-yes rule may have a greater risk of
high-confidence misidentifications under suboptimal conditions compared to simultaneous
lineups. Although simultaneous lineups and sequential lineups (with a final decision option)
were similarly effective, it is critical to highlight that there was no scenario in which the
sequential lineup procedure outperformed the simultaneous lineup procedure in either our CAC
or ROC analyses. In fact, our ROC curves suggested a slight advantage for simultaneous lineups.
Moreover, we want to emphasize that our study only tested a specific variant of the sequential
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lineup procedure format, and thus, it is unclear whether other variants of the sequential lineup
procedure may introduce a boundary condition unobserved in the present study. Compared to
simultaneous lineups, there are far more variables to consider when administering a sequential
lineup such as the first-yes-count instructions, backloading instructions, whether or not to allow
for a second lap of a lineup, and many more (e.g., Carlson et al., 2016; Horry et al., 2020;
Meisters et al., 2018). Because of the complexity of the sequential lineup procedure and the fact
that it did not seem to provide any benefits above and beyond that of simultaneous lineups in the
present study, the simultaneous lineup is a safer and more reliable lineup procedure for the
applied settings.

5.4 Theoretical Implications
The purpose of the present study was not to test specific theories. As such, we did not design our
experiment in ways that would enable us to distinguish between different accounts. However,
some of our findings do seem to raise a few questions for the theoretical accounts we discussed
earlier: the optimality account (Deffenbacher, 1980), the likelihood-ratio account (Semmler et
al., 2018), and the decision-processes account (Gettleman et al., 2021). Although some of our
results favor one account over another, no one account explains both of our suspect-ID accuracy
and calibration results.
The Optimality Account. According to the optimality account, the predictive value of
confidence depends on the optimality of information processing conditions. Consistent with this
account, our CAC results show that suspect-ID accuracy for high-confidence identifications was
significantly lower for difficult than easy materials. Because the present study did not
experimentally manipulate estimator variables, we cannot pinpoint the specific factor that
negatively affected suspect-ID accuracy levels of high-confidence identifications. However, a
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few recent studies have shown that poor viewing conditions can have a significant impact on
suspect-ID accuracy, even for high-confidence identifications (Giacona et al., 2021; Lockamyeir
et al., 2020). Together, these findings suggest there is a greater risk of high-confidence
misidentifications in less optimal conditions.
Although our calibration results indicate that people were more calibrated for easy than
difficult materials, our subsequent analysis suggests that calibration performance was moderated
by material difficulty and face recognition ability. That is, within each material difficulty
condition (easy vs. difficult materials), good face recognizers tended to be more calibrated than
poor face recognizers, suggesting that the optimality of information processing conditions alone
does not fully explain individual differences in which people scaled their confidence judgments.
Despite differences in methodological and statistical procedures, our calibration results are
similar to that of Gettleman et al. (2021). Unlike the present study, Gettleman and colleagues
systematically manipulated the number of exposures to a suspect’s face and retention interval.
Even after equating overall identification performance across their experimental conditions, they
still observed differences in calibration between good and poor face recognizers. In short, the
correspondence between eyewitness confidence and accuracy depends not only on the optimality
of information-processing conditions but also on individual differences in face recognition
ability.
The Likelihood-Ratio Account. The likelihood-ratio account posits that high-confidence
judgments remain highly reliable even under suboptimal conditions (Semmler et al., 2018). It
suggests that people learn to adjust their confidence judgments through a lifetime of errorfeedback training (Mickes et al., 2011). Under less optimal conditions, people “fan out” their
confidence criteria across a memory-strength continuum, such that high-confidence judgments
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now require an even stronger memory-match signal. Although high-confidence identifications
remained highly predictive of accuracy for the majority of our twelve material sets, highconfidence identifications for easy eyewitness materials were significantly more accurate than
for difficult eyewitness materials. Our finding may not simply be an outlier because a few recent
studies have also reported similar findings for suboptimal estimator variables (Giacona et al.,
2021; Lockamyeir et al., 2020; Pezdek et al., 2020). Moreover, Smith and colleagues (2021)
have recently stated that “conclusions about the equivalence of high-confidence suspectidentification accuracy across variations in memory strength are impressive only to the extent
that memory strength actually differed across the conditions being compared.” In other words,
some prior studies may not have observed differences in suspect-ID accuracy for highconfidence identifications because their comparisons involved conditions that were not
significantly different from each other in terms of memory strength.
Although the likelihood-ratio account does not make any predictions about calibration
performance, our calibration results offer some insight into how people scale their confidence
judgments. For example, we observed a strong negative correlation between material difficulty
and calibration, which suggests that people were overall more calibrated for easy than difficult
eyewitness materials. In line with Gettleman et al. (2020), our results also show that face
recognition ability influenced calibration performance. Good face recognizers were adept at
scaling their confidence judgments than poor face recognizers. Furthermore, our EMS results
revealed that people who hold a negative perception of their memory abilities (i.e., Memory
Discontentment) were less accurate than those who do not hold such perception. Saraiva and
colleagues have observed differences in calibration accuracy based on high-confidence
identifications from high versus low scorers on the Memory Discontentment factor; the present
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study replicated this pattern with suspect-ID accuracy. One might expect high scorers to be more
cautious when making confidence judgments, yet they were still less accurate than low scorers.
Therefore, people adjust their confidence levels, but they may not be able to do so adequately
across different circumstances.
The Decision-Processes Account. The decision-processes account suggests that
expertise in a particular domain enhances one’s metacognitive monitoring for that domain, which
in turn contributes to the confidence-accuracy relationship (Gettleman et al., 2021; Kruger &
Dunning, 1999). This explanation was used to explain why high-confidence identifications are
more predictive of accuracy for good face recognizers than poor face recognizers. Evidence in
support of the decision-processes account comes from chooser accuracy and the proxy measure
of suspect-ID accuracy (Gettleman et al., 2021). Unlike Gettleman et al., the present study
directly measured suspect-ID accuracy, and we found that good and poor face recognizers did
not significantly differ in suspect-ID accuracy for high-confidence identifications. As we have
discussed in earlier sections, our results may be inconsistent with those from Gettleman et al.
(2020) because we used a different statistical method (i.e., bootstrap vs. mixed-effect model,
respectively) and a different dependent variable (i.e., suspect-ID accuracy vs. a proxy measure of
suspect-ID accuracy, respectively). We also did not observe a difference in suspect-ID accuracy
across our three face recognition groups when we examined the interaction between material
difficulty and face recognition ability. In contrast to our suspect-ID accuracy results, our
calibration results were consistent with the decision-processes account; good face recognizers
were better at adjusting their confidence levels in accordance with the material difficulty level
compared to poor face recognizers.
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Although Gettleman et al.’s (2020) decision-processes account suggests metacognition is
domain-specific, it did not measure metacognitive performance other than for face recognition.
In other words, it does not eliminate the potential contribution of domain-general processes. In
the present study, we examined metacognitive performance for related and unrelated tasks. Some
individuals were consistently overconfident, whereas others were consistently underconfident
irrespective of tasks, which suggests domain generality. However, recent metacognition studies
have suggested that metacognition performance may reflect both domain-specific and domaingeneral processes (e.g., Mazancieux, Fleming, Souchay, & Moulin, 2020; Scott & Berman,
2013). Therefore, both domain-general and domain-specific processes may contribute to the
eyewitness confidence-accuracy relationship.

5.5 Other Individual Difference Factors Besides Face
Recognition Ability
Although early attempts at examining individual difference factors in eyewitness identifications
have been largely unfruitful (Courtois & Mueller, 1981; Cutler & Wolfe, 1989; Hosch, 1994),
recent studies that examined the relationship between face recognition ability and eyewitness
identification performance have shown encouraging results (e.g., Gettleman et al., 2020;
Grabman et al., 2019). A secondary objective of the present study was to explore other potential
individual difference factors besides face recognition ability. We first examined whether
people’s insight about their own face recognition ability and memory functioning affects the
strength of the confidence-accuracy relationship. Next, we were interested in the role of facematching ability and/or word recognition ability in people’s ability to correctly identify the
suspect. Lastly, we asked whether people’s ability to judge their own performance is a general
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ability or specific to a particular domain. We will now discuss these findings and their
implications in turn.
We assessed people’s insight about their face recognition ability and memory functioning
using the recently published Eyewitness Metamemory Scale (EMS; Saraiva et al., 2019). Using
the EMS, Saraiva and colleagues (2020) have reported significant differences in accuracy across
the three EMS factors: Memory Contentment, Memory Discontentment, and Memory Strategies.
However, they analyzed their data using the calibration approach instead of the CAC approach
used in the present study. Out of the three EMS factors, only the Memory Discontentment factor
produced a significant difference in suspect-ID accuracy between high and low scorers at the 90100 confidence bin. The other two EMS factors were no better at distinguishing between good
and poor witnesses than simply using a high-confidence criterion. Therefore, if the dependent
variable of interest is suspect-ID accuracy, then one could argue for the use of the EMS but only
the items for the Memory Discontentment factor.
Although the EMS may have limited utility in the applied settings, Saraiva and
colleagues' (2020) findings have theoretical implications as they have shown that awareness of
one’s face recognition ability can affect metacognitive judgments in face-related tasks such as
eyewitness identification. Using their brief questionnaire, Saraiva et al. (2020) found that people
who scored low on EMS factors tend to be better judges of their eyewitness identification
performance (i.e., more calibrated) than those who reported higher ratings. Their results are
consistent with prior findings from the face recognition literature. For example, although face
recognition is a part of everyday life, studies have typically reported that people have modest
insight into their face recognition ability (Matsuyoshi & Watanabe, 2021; Palermo et al., 2017).
One potential explanation for this paradox is that people conflate their experiences with
129

recognizing familiar faces to their experiences with unfamiliar faces (White, Kemp, Jenkins, &
Burton, 2014), even though unfamiliar faces are not processed the same way as familiar faces
(for a review, see Johnston & Edmonds, 2009). Furthermore, people may not always receive
feedback for identifications involving unfamiliar faces outside of laboratories and therefore it
leaves the belief about their own ability unchallenged (Jenkins & Burton, 2011). As such,
instances of mismatch between perceived and objective performance are expected in both face
recognition and eyewitness identification literature. Thus, findings, such as those from Saraiva et
al. (2020), can help bridge a gap between two related domains of research.
In addition to the EMS, we were interested in exploring other individual difference
factors. More specifically, we examined whether face-matching and word recognition abilities,
like face recognition ability, are also predictive of eyewitness identification performance. We
used the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT) to measure face recognition or face memory
(i.e., one’s ability to recognize previously studied faces after a delay) and we used the Glasgow
Face Matching Test (GFMT) to measure face perception (i.e., one’s ability to discriminate
among simultaneously presented faces). We used the DRM lineup task (Finley et al., 2020), a
word recognition task, as a means to assess whether the predictability of CFMT on identification
performance (chooser accuracy) could be also attributed to a general recognition ability. CFMT
and GFMT performance were not only correlated but were also predictive of identification
performance on the eyewitness identification task. This is expected because face-memory and
face-perception abilities are related, though they do involve dissociable mechanisms and have
different developmental trajectories (Dalrymple et al., 2014; Weigelt et al., 2014). Verhallen and
colleagues (2017) have suggested that there is a “discrimination” component in the CFMT
because participants have to choose the correct faces from an array of three faces. However, our
130

results suggest that performance on both tests appear to individually contribute to identification
accuracy. Furthermore, the CFMT requires participants to retrieve the previously seen faces from
memory, whereas the GFMT does not have such demand as the faces are presented side by side.
Therefore, each test is potentially measuring different processes.
There was no main effect of DRM on chooser accuracy, but to our surprise, there was an
interaction between GFMT and DRM. Individuals who performed well on the GFMT and DRM
lineups tended to be more accurate on the eyewitness identification task, but those who
performed poorly on the GFMT but performed well on the DRM lineups were slightly less
accurate on the eyewitness identification task. Currently, we do not have a theoretical
explanation for this finding because prior studies have suggested that face recognition and word
recognition abilities are unrelated and can be selectively affected by brain injury (Robotham &
Starrfelt, 2017; Susilo et al., 2015). Future studies should consider including additional
recognition tasks such as objects (e.g., animals or cars), paintings, or abstract shapes. The
inclusion of these additional tasks may better disentangle the contribution of a domain-general or
domain-specific ability on task performance; this is an ongoing debate in visual object
recognition literature (for a review, see Gauthier, 2018; Gauthier et al., 2014; Richler, Wilmer, &
Gauthier, 2017).
Lastly, another interesting finding from our exploratory analysis is that calibration
performance (i.e., the bias index) moderately correlated among our four tasks (eyewitness lineup,
DRM lineup, GFMT, and general knowledge tasks) despite being weakly correlated in terms of
accuracy. Some individuals tended to overestimate their task performance, whereas others tended
to underestimate their task performance; more importantly, their tendency was maintained across
tasks from different domains, suggesting that metacognition may be domain-general(Bornstein &
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Zickafoose, 1999; Dentakos et al., 2019). This finding is also consistent with what has been
called the self-confidence trait, which suggests that people who are more confident on one task
are likely to be more confident on other tasks (see Kleitman & Stankov, 2007).
Although our findings are consistent with prior research, the design of our study may not
have sufficiently allowed us to capture a domain-specific effect. Our four tasks varied in the
number of items. For example, the percent correct for the eyewitness lineup task could be based
on 12 items or fewer depending on the specific participant. If a particular mock video did not
play or participants had previously seen the stimuli in another study, then that specific trial was
excluded from the calculation. The DRM lineup task had 16 items, the general knowledge task
had 30 items, and the GFMT had 40 items. The different numbers of test items also mean that the
reliability of the task score (i.e., the bias index) likely varied across tasks, which in turn may
affect the correlation between two tasks. Although we did not measure confidence in the CFMT
task, we did find that individuals who scored high on the CFMT were also more calibrated on the
eyewitness lineup task than those who scored low on the CFMT. Of course, the raw CFMT score
is not the same as a calibration score (i.e., a bias index) for the CFMT task. Because we did not
measure confidence in CFMT, it is unclear whether these individuals would show similar
calibration performance across these two tasks. It may be difficult to correlate our eyewitness
lineup task with the CFMT, given that the CFMT has 72 items. Ideally, the test format should
also be the same across related and unrelated tasks (Mazancieux et al., 2020). Thus, the design of
the present study is insufficient in eliminating the possibility of domain-specific influences on
metacognitive performance.
Implications. The findings discussed in this section have theoretical implications, but
they are generally not relevant for the applied settings. For example, the 23-item EMS is unlikely
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to administer in real-world settings, specifically when the 23-item EMS was largely ineffective
compared to a simple high-confidence criterion in terms of separating good from poor witnesses;
however, high and low scorers on the Memory Discontentment factor did differ in suspect-ID
accuracy even for high-confidence identifications. Unlike the other two EMS factors (Memory
Contentment and Memory Strategies), a higher rating on Memory Discontentment items means
poorer memory abilities (e.g., “Compared to other people, I think I would be a much worse
eyewitness.” “As I age, I find my ability to remember faces is getting worse.”). These items are
related to negative self‐perception of memory ability. Perhaps, negative-wording questions, such
as those Memory Discontentment items, may be more effective in distinguishing between good
and poor witnesses than positive-wording questions. If this is the case, then this finding may
serve as a starting point for the development of future eyewitness metamemory scales.
The CFMT and the GFMT are unlikely to be adopted as a part of standard eyewitness
identification protocol. Of course, these tests could serve as potential secondary indicators of
identification accuracy. If such a need ever arises, our results suggest that a standardized face test
that includes both face-memory and face-perception components may be more useful than a
standardized test that only assesses one of these components. Similarly, applied settings are
unlikely to administer multiple tests to measure metacognitive accuracy and then use this
information to gauge the reliability of a witness's confidence statement even if metacognition is
indeed domain-general. However, there are some ongoing works on the assessment of the selfconfidence factor (see Kleitman & Stankov, 2007); perhaps it may be possible to reliably gauge
people’s general tendency to be over- or underconfident across different tasks with a single test.
In short, our results and those from other similar studies may contribute to the development of
future theories and new screening tools.
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5.6 Limitations
There are limitations to our study. To test a wide array of different eyewitness stimuli developed
by different eyewitness researchers, we sacrificed experimental control. Although we knew two
sets of eyewitness materials did produce a material effect from Tekin, Lin, and Roediger
(2018)’s findings, we did not know the full range of difficulty levels of the remaining ten
material sets relative to these two sets. These twelve sets happened to have a wide range of
difficulty levels, and their relative difficulty was replicated across Experiments 1 and 2. Even
though our study did not systematically manipulate estimator variables like other studies
(Gettleman et al., 2021; Palmer et al., 2013; Weber & Brewer, 2004), our findings are more
generalizable compared to most studies that used 1-2 material sets, which oftentimes do not
differ in difficulty levels (e.g., Andersen et al., 2014). Furthermore, because our material sets
were created by different eyewitness researchers, they also function as a rough proxy for how
different real-world police departments might put together their lineups for various criminal
cases.
Another limitation of our study is the lack of a retention interval. Participants were
presented with the lineup almost immediately following the mock crime video. Although lineups
that occur soon after the presentation are relatively common as an experimental practice, outside
the lab lineups that occur soon after the crime are rare. Despite this limitation, we were still able
to obtain differences in performance despite the lack of a retention interval. Nonetheless, in
future research, we hope to address the issue of whether patterns of results similar to ours will
occur when there is a realistic delay between the crime and the identification process.
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5.7 Conclusions
In summary, the present study suggests three primary conclusions regarding eyewitness
identification research. First, there is a positive relationship between eyewitness confidence and
accuracy, but the precise correspondence (i.e., calibration) between two variables can vary
depending on moderator variables. Second, high confidence is generally associated with high
suspect-ID accuracy, but in a few cases, difficult situational factors can lower suspect-ID
accuracy below 90% even for high-confidence identifications. Future studies should identify
these specific boundary conditions. Lastly, the simultaneous and sequential lineup (with a final
decision option) procedures are similarly effective; however, the present study only tested a
specific variation of the sequential lineup procedure. Given the numerous possible configurations
of sequential lineup procedures and the various potential crime scenarios (i.e., different
combinations of situational factors with varying levels of optimality), we believe the
simultaneous lineup procedure is the safer and more reliable choice for the applied settings.
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Appendix A
List of eyewitness materials
Source
(Authors)

Description

Exposure
Duration

Video
Length

Baldassari
& Lindsay

Caucasian male with blonde hair enters an office, steals
keys from the desk, exits the office, walks into a parking
lot, and enters a sedan.

20 s

46 s

20 s

40 s

51 s

1 min 57 s

7s

23 s

10 s

1 min 32 s

22 s

1 min 13 s

Obtained via: https://osf.io/zb85d

Baldassari
& Lindsay

Caucasian male with dark brown hair enters an office,
steals keys from the desk, exits the office, walks into a
parking lot, and enters a large vehicle.
Obtained via: https://osf.io/zb85d

Brewer

A male enters a restaurant, makes small talk with the
waiter, steals a credit card, runs out of the store (Brewer
et al., 2002).
Obtained via: E-mail communication

John
Wixted

A tall Caucasian male with dark brown hair walks into an
office, steals a computer, and leaves the office (Mickes et
al., 2012).
Obtained via: E-mail communication

Horry

A brunette woman begins to take things from the shelves
and put them into her bag, drops them and picks them up,
and runs out of the store (Horry, Brewer, & Weber,
2016).
Obtained via: E-mail communication

Ruth Horry

A bald Caucasian male (drug dealer) with and his hood
up is smoking a cigarette on a playground. Another
Caucasian male (drug buyer) walks up. The drug dealer
takes marijuana out of his pocket and hands it to the
other man in exchange for cash. The drug dealer says it is
not enough, so the drug buyer hands him more cash and
walks away (Horry et al., 2016).
Obtained via: E-mail communication
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Steven
Clark

There is a hallway, and a witness is walking down a
hallway. He passes a woman using an ATM. Suddenly, a
Caucasian male points his gun at the woman and steals
the woman's wallet, and runs away (Clark, Brower,
Rosenthal, Hicks, & Moreland, 2013).

3s

30 s

3s

17 s

5s

16 s

6s

21 s

2s

9s

6s

27 s

Obtained via: E-mail communication
Laura
Mickes

A Hispanic male is graffitiing a wall, walks towards the
camera, and then puts his hood up as he walks away.
Obtained via: E-mail communication

Laura
Mickes

A Caucasian female is graffitiing a wall, turns around
and walks towards the camera, and then walks away.
Obtained via: E-mail communication

Laura
Mickes

A Caucasian male is graffitiing a wall, turns around and
faces the camera, puts the spray can in his pocket, takes
his hood down, and walks away.
Obtained via: E-mail communication

Laura
Mickes

A Caucasian male with dark brown hair walks up to the
camera and steals something and runs away.
Obtained via: E-mail communication

Laura
Mickes

A Caucasian male with dark brown hair enters a
building, sees laptop unattended on desk, takes laptop,
and exits building.
Obtained via: E-mail communication

We would like to thank Neil Brewer, John Wixted, Ruth Horry, Steven Clark, and Laura Mickes
for sending us their eyewitness stimuli.
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Appendix B
Eyewitness Metamemory Questionnaire
Items Relating to Memory Contentment
1. My ability to remember faces is much better than other people's ability to remember faces.
2. I am confident with my ability to remember faces in a stressful situation.
3. Compared to other people, I think I would be a much better eyewitness.
4. If I saw someone commit a crime, I am certain that I would remember his/her face.
5. If I witnessed a robbery, I would be able to recognize the perpetrator a month later.
6. As I age, I find my ability to remember faces is getting better.
7. I am generally satisfied with my ability to remember the faces of people I have only met once.
8. My ability to correctly remember where and when I saw a particular face has improved over
time.
9. I can give a detailed description of a friend's face to a stranger.
10. I recognize relatively unknown actors, if I have seen them in another movie/television show.
Items Relating to Memory Discontentment
11. Sometimes I have trouble recognizing a person that I know relatively well.
12. My ability to remember faces is much worse than other people's ability to remember faces.
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13. It often happens that a person who seems familiar starts a conversation with me, but I have
no idea who the person is.
14. Whenever I meet an important person, I am worried that I will not be able to recognize
him/her a week later.
15. Compared to other people, I think I would be a much worse eyewitness.
16. My ability to correctly remember where and when I saw a particular face has deteriorated
over time.
17. When I see a person that looks familiar, I often do not know where I have seen that person
before.
18. As I age, I find my ability to remember faces is getting worse.
Items Relating to Memory Strategies
19. Compared to other people, I more often use a strategy (e.g., focus on specific facial features
such as eyes) to remember a person's face.
20. Compared to ten years ago, I more often use a strategy (e.g., focus on specific facial features
such as eyes) to remember a person's face.
21. In order to remember a perpetrator's face, I would definitely use a strategy (e.g., focus on
specific facial features such as eyes) to remember the perpetrator's face.
22. I often focus on specific facial features such as nose and eyes when I am paying attention to a
face that I have to remember.
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23. I often create a visual image in my mind of a face that I want to remember.
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Appendix C
DRM Lineup Materials
We would like to thank Jason Finley for sending us these materials.

DRM List
SOFT

RIVER

HIGH

PEN

Study
hard
light
pillow
plush
loud
cotton
fur
touch
fluffy
feather
water
stream
lake
Mississippi
boat
tide
swim
flow
run
barge
low
clouds
up
tall
tower
jump
above
building
noon
cliff
pencil
write
fountain
leak

TP
tender
furry
touch
skin
kitten
downy

TPTarget
touch

TA
silk
downy
skin
furry
kitten
tender

brook
winding
creek
fish
swim
bridge

swim

bridge
fish
brook
creek
falls
winding

sky
over
dive
elevate
above
airplane

above

sky
dizzy
over
elevate
airplane
dive

marker
cap
felt
tip

felt

marker
letter
red
tip
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PEN
SLOW

COTTAGE

MAN

NEEDLE

quill
felt
Bic
scribble
crayon
Cross
fast
lethargic
stop
listless
snail
cautious
delay
traffic
turtle
hesitant
house
lake
cheese
home
white
cabin
small
door
fence
vines
woman
husband
uncle
lady
mouse
male
father
strong
friend
beard
thread
pin
eye
sewing
sharp
point
prick
thimble

red
letter

cap
paper

molasses
delay
quick
speed
sluggish
wait

delay

molasses
sluggish
quick
wait
speed
sleet

fence
roses
hut
cozy
woods
ivy

fence

grove
cozy
ivy
roses
woods
hut

muscle
father
suit
old
father
handsome
person

muscle
suit
person
handsome
old
sports

syringe
cloth
prick
hurt
injection
knitting

syringe
hurt
string
cloth
knitting
injection

prick
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haystack
thorn
ARMY
Navy
soldier
United States
rifle
Air
Force
draft
military
Marines
march
infantry
SWEET
sour
candy
sugar
bitter
good
taste
tooth
nice
honey
soda
THIEF
steal
robber
crook
burglar
money
cop
bad
rob
jail
gun
CABBAGE head
lettuce
vegetable
food
salad
green
garden
leaf
sauerkraut
smell
CAR
truck

captain
pilot
uniform
draft

draft

combat
war
pilot
uniform

combat
war

captain
service

chocolate tooth
cake
heart
tooth
tart
pie

cake
heart
tart
cream
pie
chocolate

crook
crime
villain
bandit
bank
criminal

crook

crime
bank
sneak
bandit
criminal
villain

leaf
carrots
plant
slaw
patch
soup

leaf

field
slaw
soup
plant
patch
carrots

garage

train

taxi

161

JUSTICE

WHISKEY

SMOKE

bus
train
automobile
vehicle
drive
jeep
Ford
race
keys
peace
law
courts
judge
right
liberty
government
jury
truth
blind
drink
drunk
beer
liquor
gin
bottles
alcohol
rye
glass
wine
cigarette
puff
blaze
billows
pollution
ashes
cigar
chimney
fire
tobacco

sedan
train
taxi
van
highway

highway
van
garage
sedan
plane

supreme judge
crime
department
trial
judge
fair

department
honor
supreme
trial
crime
fair

bourbon
beer
rum
scotch
bar
evil

beer

scotch
bar
brandy
bourbon
evil
rum

pipe
lungs
stain
stink
flames
cigar

cigar

stink
fog
pipe
lungs
stain
flames
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Appendix D
General Knowledge Questions
1. WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE HORSE-LIKE ANIMAL WITH BLACK AND
WHITE STRIPES? (ZEBRA)
2. WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE REMAINS OF PLANTS AND ANIMALS THAT ARE
FOUND IN STONE? (FOSSILS)
3. WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE AUTHOR WHO WROTE “ROMEO AND
JULIET”? (SHAKESPEARE)
4. WHAT IS THE NAME OF A DRIED GRAPE? (RAISIN)
5. WHAT ANIMAL RUNS THE FASTEST? (CHEETAH)
6. WHAT IS THE NAME OF A GIANT OCEAN WAVE CAUSED BY AN
EARTHQUAKE? (TSUNAMI)
7. WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE FIRST PERSON TO SET FOOT ON THE
MOON? (ARMSTRONG)
8. WHAT IS THE CAPITAL OF FRANCE? (PARIS)
9. WHAT IS THE NAME OF AN INABILITY TO SLEEP? (INSOMNIA)
10. WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE LARGEST OCEAN ON EARTH? (PACIFIC)
11. WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE BIRD THAT CANNOT FLY AND IS THE LARGEST
BIRD ON EARTH? (OSTRICH)
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12. WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE ISLAND-CITY BELIEVED SINCE ANTIQUITY TO
HAVE SUNK INTO THE OCEAN? (ATLANTIS)
13. WHAT IS THE NAME OF A YOUNG SHEEP? (LAMB)
14. WHAT IS THE LARGEST PLANET IN THE SOLAR SYSTEM? (JUPITER)
15. WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE LEGENDARY ONE-EYED GIANT IN GREEK
MYTHOLOGY? (CYCLOPS)
16. WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE LIQUID PORTION OF WHOLE BLOOD?
(PLASMA)
17. WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE CITY IN ITALY THAT IS KNOWN FOR ITS
CANALS? (VENICE)
18. WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE DESERT PEOPLE WHO WANDER INSTEAD OF
LIVING IN ONE PLACE? (NOMADS)
19. WHAT IS THE NAME OF DEER MEAT? (VENISON)
20. WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE CRIME IN WHICH A PERSON PURPOSELY
BETRAYS HIS COUNTRY? (TREASON)
21. WHAT IS THE ONLY LIQUID METAL AT ROOM TEMPERATURE? (MERCURY)
22. WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE ORGAN THAT PRODUCES INSULIN?
(PANCREAS)
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23. WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE MAN WHO PROPOSED THE THEORY OF
RELATIVITY? (EINSTEIN)
24. WHAT IS THE LONGEST RIVER IN SOUTH AMERICA? (AMAZON)
25. WHAT IS THE UNIT OF SOUND INTENSITY? (DECIBEL)
26. FOR WHICH COUNTRY IS THE RUPEE THE MONETARY UNIT? (INDIA)
27. THE DEEPEST PART OF THE OCEAN IS LOCATED AT WHICH TRENCH?
(MARIANA)
28. WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE ASTRONOMER WHO PUBLISHED IN 1543
HIS THEORY THAT THE EARTH REVOLVES AROUND THE SUN?
(COPERNICUS)
29. WHAT IS THE CAPITAL OF CANADA? (OTTAWA)
30. WHAT IS THE CAPITAL OF AUSTRALIA? (CANBERRA)

165

Appendix E
Table E1
Experiment 1: The distribution of CAC responses across confidence bins for the aggregate
CAC plot
Confidence Bins
ID Response
Total
0-29
30-49
50-69
70-89
90-100
453
412
846
1037
968
3716
Suspect IDs
847
587
869
550
198
3051
TA Filler IDs
Table E2
Experiment 1: The distribution of CAC responses across confidence bins for
individual material sets.
Confidence Bins
Material Set
ID Response 0-29
30-49
50-69
70-89
37
26
39
35
Suspect IDs
Mickes-Laptop
79
57
75
41
TA Filler IDs
42
35
54
39
Suspect IDs
Mickes-Purse
98
62
92
55
TA Filler IDs
41
37
51
32
Suspect IDs
Mickes-Hispanic
67
41
46
26
TA Filler IDs
97
53
77
35
Suspect IDs
Clark
137
65
87
44
TA Filler IDs
30
47
65
84
Suspect IDs
Horry-Drug
78
61
82
51
TA Filler IDs
37
37
90
87
Suspect IDs
Wixted
68
67
83
38
TA Filler IDs
43
31
75
68
Suspect IDs
Brewer
28
21
38
28
TA Filler IDs
26
21
72
122
Suspect IDs
BL-David
44
41
64
50
TA Filler IDs
40
51
101
121
Suspect IDs
Mickes-White-M
67
36
80
41
TA Filler IDs
30
35
74
127
Suspect IDs
Horry-Shoplift
59
52
79
51
TA Filler IDs
13
18
68
147
Suspect IDs
Mickes-White-F
81
60
87
69
TA Filler IDs
17
21
80
140
Suspect IDs
BL-Thomas
41
24
56
56
TA Filler IDs
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90-100

15
24
13
20
11
9
8
11
64
17
48
12
46
9
117
15
76
18
135
23
236
15
199
25

Total
152
276
183
327
172
189
270
344
290
289
299
268
263
124
358
214
389
242
401
264
482
312
457
202

Table E3
Experiment 1: The distribution of CAC responses across confidence bins for High and Low d′
conditions.
Confidence Bins
Condition
ID Response
Total
0-29
30-49
50-69
70-89
90-100
247
198
286
225
111
1067
Suspect IDs
Low d′
459
286
382
217
81
1425
TA Filler IDs
High d′

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

206
388

214
301

560
487

812
333

857
117

2649
1626

Table E4
Experiment 1: The distribution of CAC responses across confidence bins for CFMT groups
Confidence Bins
Condition
ID Response 0-29
30-49
50-69
70-89
90-100
Total
77
69
150
179
145
620
Suspect IDs
Low CFMT
161
120
195
146
49
671
TA Filler IDs
Medium CFMT

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

275
530

259
374

538
552

656
334

580
109

2308
1899

High CFMT

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

101
156

84
93

158
122

202
70

243
40

788
481
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Table E5
Experiment 1: The distribution of CAC responses across confidence bins for D′ conditions and
CFMT groups
Confidence Bins
D′
CFMT
ID
Condition
Group
Response
Total
0-29 30-49
50-69
70-89
90-100
37
22
47
26
20
152
Suspect IDs
Low
80
56
87
57
19
299
TA Filler IDs
Low

High

Medium

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

153
285

129
181

181
238

142
131

68
45

673
880

High

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

57
94

47
49

58
57

57
29

23
17

242
246

Low

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

40
81

47
64

103
108

153
89

125
30

468
372

Medium

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

122
245

130
193

357
314

514
203

512
64

1635
1019

High

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

44
62

37
44

100
65

145
41

220
23

546
235
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Table E6
Experiment 1: The distribution of CAC responses across confidence thresholds.
Confidence Thresholds
ID
70-100
80-100
90-100
D′ Condition
CFMT Group
Response
Suspect IDs
278
178
125
Low CFMT
TA Filler IDs
119
54
30
High d′

Low d′

Medium CFMT

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

1026
267

698
135

512
64

High CFMT

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

365
64

272
33

220
23

Low CFMT

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

46
76

29
36

20
19

Medium CFMT

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

210
176

117
83

68
45

High CFMT

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

80
46

37
23

23
17
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Table E7
Experiment 1: The distribution of calibration responses across confidence bins based on material
difficulty and face recognition ability categories.
Confidence Bins
D′
CFMT
ID
Condition Group
Response
Total
0-29
30-49
50-69
70-89
90-100
37
22
47
26
20
152
Suspect IDs
Low
80
56
87
57
19
299
TA Filler IDs
Low

High

Medium

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

153
285

129
181

181
238

142
131

68
45

673
880

High

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

57
94

47
49

58
57

57
29

23
17

242
246

Low

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

40
81

47
64

103
108

153
89

125
30

468
372

Medium

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

122
245

130
193

357
314

514
203

512
64

1635
1019

High

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

44
62

37
44

100
65

145
41

220
23

546
235

Table E8
Experiment 1: The distribution of ID responses across confidence bins for calibration, CAC,
worst-case scenario approaches.
Confidence Bins
Condition
ID Response 0-29 30-49 50-69 70-89 90-100
Total
Suspect IDs
453
412
846
1037
968
3716
Calibration
TA Filler IDs
1167 831
1188
765
255
4206
CAC

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

453
847

412
587

846
869

1037
550

968
198

3716
3051

Worst-case
scenario

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

272
165

261
111

521
195

666
152

604
51

2324
674
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Table E9
Experiment 1: The distribution of CAC responses across confidence bins for the three
EMS factors.
Confidence Bins
Lineup
ID
Procedure
Group
Response
Total
0-50 51-89 90-100
539
527
179
1245
Suspect IDs
Low Scorers
Memory
245
16
1027
TA Filler IDs 766
Contentment
192
670
497
1359
Suspect IDs
High Scorers
656
151
1196
TA Filler IDs 389

Memory
Discontentment

Memory
Strategies

Low Scorers
High Scorers

Low Scorers
High Scorers

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs
Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

335
526
334
545

616
412
542
483

452
84
231
82

1403
1022
1107
1110

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs
Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

114
173
866
1369

72
23
1552
1160

27
1
911
195

213
197
3329
2724
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Appendix F
We conducted a K-means cluster analysis using the bias indices across all four tasks (the
eyewitness identification task, the DRM lineup task, the general knowledge task, and the
GFMT). We used the average silhouette approach to determine the optimal number of clusters
for our K-means analysis. Based on Figure F1, the average silhouette approach suggested that the
optimal number of clusters was two. We then performed the K-means based on two clusters.
Figure F2 shows the results. Although there was considerable overlap between the two clusters,
one subgroup was made up of individuals who tended to be overconfident, and another subgroup
was made up of individuals who were tended to be underconfident.

Figure F1. Results from the average silhouette approach.
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Figure F2. A K-means cluster analysis based on the bias indices across the four tasks.
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Appendix G
Appendix G
Table G1
Experiment 2: The distribution of CAC responses across confidence bins for each lineup procedure's
aggregate CAC curve.
Confidence Bins
Lineup
Procedure
ID Response
Total
0-29
30-49
50-69
70-89
90-100
178
184
304
317
338
1321
Suspect IDs
Simultaneous
345
233
249
140
51
1018
TA Filler IDs
Sequential First Yes

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

132
270

124
237

235
279

312
176

229
32

1032
994

Sequential Final Decision

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

137
236

144
224

269
279

390
199

310
44

1250
982
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Table G2
Experiment 2: The distribution of CAC responses across confidence bins for individual material
sets in the Simultaneous condition.
Confidence Bins
Material Set
ID Response 0-29
Total
30-49
50-69
70-89
90-100
121
11
13
29
34
34
Suspect IDs
BL-David
79
22
16
16
19
6
TA Filler IDs
171
5
11
31
50
74
Suspect IDs
BL-Thomas
63
12
12
20
9
10
TA Filler IDs
115
31
16
31
24
13
Suspect IDs
Brewer
32
10
9
8
3
2
TA Filler IDs
72
30
21
12
5
4
Suspect IDs
Clark
118
61
25
22
7
3
TA Filler IDs
103
22
24
26
18
13
Suspect IDs
Horry-Drug
101
29
29
24
15
4
TA Filler IDs
145
10
6
27
46
56
Suspect IDs
Horry-Shoplift
93
28
21
20
18
6
TA Filler IDs
51
6
17
16
7
5
Suspect IDs
Mickes-Hispanic
64
30
12
14
6
2
TA Filler IDs
49
7
15
17
6
4
Suspect IDs
Mickes-Laptop
93
37
21
20
12
3
TA Filler IDs
88
19
19
22
18
10
Suspect IDs
Mickes-Purse
107
30
27
29
18
3
TA Filler IDs
155
3
7
26
47
72
Suspect IDs
Mickes-White-F
118
36
29
29
17
7
TA Filler IDs
119
10
18
28
32
31
Suspect IDs
Mickes-White-M
79
24
15
26
11
3
TA Filler IDs
132
24
17
39
30
22
Suspect IDs
Wixted
71
26
17
21
5
2
TA Filler IDs
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Table G3
Experiment 2: The distribution of CAC responses across confidence bins for individual material
sets in the Sequential - First Yes condition.
Confidence Bins
ID
Material Set
Response
Total
0-29
30-49
50-69
70-89
90-100
115
7
14
26
38
30
Suspect IDs
BL-David
86
21
13
27
22
3
TA Filler IDs
133
4
9
23
42
55
Suspect IDs
BL-Thomas
74
13
15
23
21
2
TA Filler IDs
101
16
11
25
37
12
Suspect IDs
Brewer
32
9
9
6
5
3
TA Filler IDs
55
24
12
14
5
0
Suspect IDs
Clark
114
44
30
24
11
5
TA Filler IDs
45
6
10
14
13
2
Suspect IDs
Horry-Drug
118
34
27
32
19
6
TA Filler IDs
114
3
10
27
40
34
Suspect IDs
Horry-Shoplift
82
22
21
24
14
1
TA Filler IDs
64
20
13
14
13
4
Suspect IDs
Mickes-Hispanic
41
10
8
14
9
0
TA Filler IDs
34
9
5
11
6
3
Suspect IDs
Mickes-Laptop
102
28
26
28
20
0
TA Filler IDs
57
13
12
14
10
8
Suspect IDs
Mickes-Purse
96
22
27
26
18
3
TA Filler IDs
114
4
3
16
35
56
Suspect IDs
Mickes-White-F
99
27
22
31
17
2
TA Filler IDs
121
19
13
32
42
15
Suspect IDs
Mickes-White-M
65
20
12
19
11
3
TA Filler IDs
79
7
12
19
31
10
Suspect IDs
Wixted
85
20
27
25
9
4
TA Filler IDs
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Table G4
Experiment 2: The distribution of CAC responses across confidence bins for individual material
sets in the Sequential - Final Decision condition.
Confidence Bins
Material Set
ID Response 0-29
Total
30-49
50-69
70-89
90-100
127
7
14
27
42
37
Suspect IDs
BL-David
85
16
15
24
26
4
TA Filler IDs
160
7
11
24
49
69
Suspect IDs
BL-Thomas
74
9
17
22
22
4
TA Filler IDs
103
15
12
26
38
12
Suspect IDs
Brewer
32
8
9
7
5
3
TA Filler IDs
66
25
13
19
8
1
Suspect IDs
Clark
112
40
25
24
17
6
TA Filler IDs
70
7
15
19
23
6
Suspect IDs
Horry-Drug
117
29
22
35
23
8
TA Filler IDs
158
6
13
32
52
55
Suspect IDs
Horry-Shoplift
80
21
19
26
12
2
TA Filler IDs
71
20
14
17
16
4
Suspect IDs
Mickes-Hispanic
41
10
8
14
9
0
TA Filler IDs
33
7
5
10
7
4
Suspect IDs
Mickes-Laptop
100
26
25
25
22
2
TA Filler IDs
77
13
15
20
21
8
Suspect IDs
Mickes-Purse
94
20
24
26
21
3
TA Filler IDs
160
4
6
21
49
80
Suspect IDs
Mickes-White-F
98
23
17
35
18
5
TA Filler IDs
135
18
12
34
50
21
Suspect IDs
Mickes-White-M
64
17
15
17
12
3
TA Filler IDs
90
8
14
20
35
13
Suspect IDs
Wixted
85
17
28
24
12
4
TA Filler IDs

177

Table G5
Experiment 2: The distribution of CAC responses across confidence bins for lineup procedures
within d′ conditions.
Confidence Bins
Condition Lineup Procedure ID Response 0-29 30-49 50-69 70-89 90-100 Total
94
88
211
263
302 958
Suspect IDs
Simultaneous
158
119
140
82
36 535
TA Filler IDs
Sequential - First Suspect IDs
60
72
168
265
212 777
High d′
Yes
132
119
155
99
18 523
TA Filler IDs
Sequential - Final Suspect IDs
65
82
184
315
287 933
Decision
111
120
155
107
25 518
TA Filler IDs
Simultaneous
Low d′

Sequential - First
Yes
Sequential - Final
Decision

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs
Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs
Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

178

84
187
72
138
72
125

96
114
52
118
62
104

93
109
67
124
85
124

54
58
47
77
75
92

36
15
17
14
23
19

363
483
255
471
317
464

Table G6
Experiment 2: The distribution of CAC responses across confidence bins for lineup procedures
within CFMT groups.
Confidence Bins
CFMT

Lineup Procedure
Simultaneous

Low
CFMT

Sequential - First Yes
Sequential - Final Decision
Simultaneous

Medium
CFMT

Sequential - First Yes
Sequential - Final Decision
Simultaneous

High
CFMT

Sequential - First Yes
Sequential - Final Decision

ID
Response

0-50

51-89

90-100

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs
Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs
Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

73
118
50
130
60
118

81
76
70
93
87
96

44
13
20
5
36
11

Total
198
207
140
228
183
225

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs
Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs
Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

265
412
208
379
224
343

359
189
302
229
367
251

187
28
148
22
196
28

811
629
658
630
787
622

Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs
Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs
Suspect IDs
TA Filler IDs

101
125
56
79
60
74

104
47
117
52
142
56

107
10
61
5
78
5

312
182
234
136
280
135
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